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The Greenwashing Deluge: Who Will Rise
Above the Waters of Deceptive Advertising?
ELIZABETH
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We grew up founding our dreams on the infinite promise of American
advertising. I still believe that one can learn to play the piano by mail
and that mud will give you a perfect complexion.
-Zelda Fitzgerald
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INTRODUCTION

When asked to discuss their thoughts on the rising concern over
"greenwashing," most ordinary people would casually respond with a
blank stare. Although businesses have engaged in the practice of greenwashing for the past two decades-causing legislatures, courts, and consumer organizations to concern themselves with this pervading issuet
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the general public still remains somewhat unmindful of the concept and

unfamiliar with the term. Some scholars have defined greenwashing as
"the advertising of a product as 'environmentally friendly' when some
aspect of the product (or its distribution) has, in fact, deleterious effects
on the environment."' Others have more broadly defined greenwashing

as a specific variant of "whitewashing" in which parties "attempt to
cover up or excuse wrongdoing through false statements or the biased
presentation of data."' At a basic level, corporations greenwash consum-

ers by making "subtle use of specific colors, images, typefaces," and a
seemingly genuine storyline-about how nature lovers should purchase

these products to stay true to their eco-conscious selves-in order to
market products.3
The recent surge in environmental marketing 4 alongside significant
consumer and governmental concerns over deceptive advertising warrant extensive discussion of the various means by which the legal community may address potential greenwashing claims. This article explores
varying approaches to the issue of greenwashing claims and argues that
the Federal Trade Commission's upcoming release of its revised Guides
for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, or "Green Guides," in
conjunction with the Federal Lanham Act is likely to heighten enforcement of greenwashing actions in the coming years. This article further
argues that should the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") fail to
actively enforce greenwashing claims subsequent to releasing its revised
Green Guides, federal courts will unabashedly step in to fill the enforcement gap.
Part II provides context as to current concerns over environmental
1. David Hoch & Robert Franz, Eco-Porn Versus the Constitution: Commercial Speech and
the Regulation of Environmental Advertising, 58 ALB. L. REv. 441, 441 (1994).
2. Robert Lamb, How Greenwashing Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS.COM, Jan. 25, 2008, http://

www.howstuffworks.com/greenwashing.htm.
3. Id.
4. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE FTC

IN

2010: FED. TRADE COMM'N ANNUAL REPORT 51

(2010), availableat http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/04/2010ChairmansReport.pdf [hereinafter FTC IN
2010] (explaining that "[c]onsumers are increasingly making purchasing decisions based on the
environmental impact of products . . .[and so] marketers are making green claims about their
products"); FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE FTC IN 2009: FED. TRADE COMM'N ANNUAL REPORT 76
(2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/03/2009ftcrptpv.pdf [hereinafter FTC IN 2009]
(citing a "virtual tsunami of green marketing"); Lydia Parnes, Dir., Bureau of Consumer Prot.,
Fed. Trade Comm'n, Remarks at the 56th Annual Antitrust Spring Meeting 7-8 (Mar. 28, 2008),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pames/080328aba.pdf [hereinafter Pames Remarks
2008] (explaining how the FTC witnessed "a virtual explosion of green marketing" in 2007);
David C. Vladeck, Dir., Bureau of Consumer Prot., Remarks Before Magazine Publishers of Am.
2 (Feb. 25, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/vladeck/100225mpaspeech.pdf
[hereinafter Vlaldeck Remarks 2010] ("In recent years, environmental marketing has
proliferated."); Matthew J. Parlow, Greenwashed: Developers, Environmental Consciousness,and
the Case of Playa Vista, 35 B.C. ENVTL. Ai'. L. REv. 513, 513-14 (2008).
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marketing claims in categorical form. Part III emphasizes the cyclical
nature of greenwashing claims, providing a chronology of FTC and state
action toward greenwashing throughout the past two decades. Part IV
examines the FTC's role as the primary enforcement agency for greenwashing claims, describing the intersection of the Green Guides to the
traditional analysis of deceptive marketing practices, arguing that
because deceptive environmental-marketing claims differ significantly
from traditional deceptive claims, regulatory approaches should account
for such distinctions.
Part V addresses a scenario in which the FTC fails to actively
enforce greenwashing claims, arguing that the federal courts can and
will likely play a role in greenwashing disputes by virtue of the Federal
Lanham Act. Part VI questions the Supreme Court's failure to intervene
with regards to environmental marketing claims, focusing on concerns
over "patchwork" regulatory efforts. Part VII discusses current and
potential disagreements arising from the need for regulations concerning
environmental marketing.
II.

TRENDS IN GREEN ADVERTISING LEAD TO MOUNTING CONCERNS

With the organic food industry reaping an overwhelming $25 billion per year,5 it is no wonder that greater numbers of businesses have
decided to market their products as "green. ' This article does not aim to
disparage sincere efforts at promoting a more eco-friendly consumer
culture, rather, this article applauds such advances and proceeds with the
purpose of narrowly examining an alarmingly understated, though pervasive, challenge to eco-friendly consumerism-greenwashing.
Greenwashing does not occur in a vacuum. Instead, societal trends
greatly affect greenwashing as environmental marketing peaks during
certain periods, mirroring the economy and perceived public opinion
respecting environmental issues. 7 Consumers who purchase "green"
products may be completely unaware that their desire to purchase such
5. Kim Severson, Be It Ever So Homespun, There's Nothing Like Spin, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3,
2007, at Fl.
6. See FTC IN2009, supra note 4, at 76; Parres Remarks 2008, supra note 4, at 8; Marianne
M. Jennings & John Entine, Business With a Soul: A Reexamination of What Counts in Business
Ethics, 20 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 1, 14-15 (1998).
7. Compare FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE FTC IN 2008: A FORCE FOR CONSUMERS AND

COMPETITION 67 (2008), available at http:/Iwww.ftc.gov/os/2008/O3/ChairmansReport2OO8.pdf
[hereinafter FTC IN 2008] (promising a "continu[ing] public dialogue on green marketing claims
as a response to "consumers becom[ing] more conscious of the impact consumption has on the...
environment") with FED. TRADE COMM'N, FED. TRADE COMM'N 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 17 (1994),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/annualreports/ar1994.pdf [hereinafter FTC IN 1994] ("Today's
consumers are increasingly concerned with ...the environmental implications of packaging and
other product attributes.").
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products is heavily influenced by a need to join the "group" of the
moment, which currently happens to relate to socially conscious consumers, 8 perhaps because "[g]uilt over the environment is at a historic
high." 9
Still, the very acknowledgment of greenwashing as a problem can

only arise in a context of flourishing social conscientiousness. Consumers and businesses alike are leaping forward into an era of unprecedented environmental awareness-and for that we should count
ourselves fortunate to have come so far in the past fifty years. 10 But we
should temper any such celebration by the notion that too much of a
good thing can at times lead to unforeseen and unwanted effects.
A.

The Collision Between Green Marketing and Greenwashing

Businesses are particularly alert to the potential economic benefits
that will likely accrue to them as a result of their entrance into the environmental marketing arena.'' The AARP recently conducted a study,
determining that "there are 40 million 'green boomers' in the United
States today," meaning that over half of the nation's "baby boomers"
currently consider themselves to be "environmentally conscious consumers."12 Businesses undoubtedly feel the pressure to fulfill their customers' expectations and therefore have responded to consumers'

demands for "green" products."
It is not simply that businesses are engaging in a greater amount of
green marketing as of late, but rather that a greater amount of businesses
8. See Vladeck remarks, supra note 4, at 2 (explaining that businesses continue to
environmentally market their products in response to "heightened consumer concern about the
environmental impact of using certain products"); Severson, supra note 5.
9. Jesse Ellison, Who Is the Greenest of Them All?, NEWSWEEK INT'L, July 14, 2008, at A4.
10. See Derek E. Bambauer, Cybersieves, 59 DuKE L. J. 377, 440-41 (2008) ("Greenwashing
... is in itself a partial victory: it occurs when companies recognize that reputation in an area such
as environmental practices motivates economic decisions by consumers.").
11. See Stuart D. Kaplow, Does a Green Building Need a Green Lease, 38 U. BALT. L. REV.
375, 396 (2009) ("companies are now further motivated to go 'Green' because of the marketing
and public relations opportunities Green practices provide, as well as improved employee
recruitment, retention, and increased worker productivity"); Carter Dillard, False Advertising,
Animals, and Ethical Consumption, 10 ANIMAL L. 25, 26-28 (2004).
12. Lamb, supra note 2. See also Hope M. Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibilityfor
Improving the Environment: Moving Toward a New Environmental Norm, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 117, 124 (2009) (explaining that "environmentalist attitudes are now well-nigh omnipresent
in American society").
13. See Deborah Platt Majoras, Fed. Trade Cmm'n Chairman, Carbon Offset Workshop
Opening Remarks 1 (Jan 8, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/carbonoffsets/
transcript/welcome-jkohm.pdf [hereinafter Majoras Remarks] (citing Patrick 0' Driscoll &
Elizabeth Weise, Green Living Takes Root, But Habits Die Hard, USA TODAY, Apr. 19, 2007, at
AI for the proposition that "8 in 10 Americans said a company's environmental record should be
an important factor in deciding whether to buy its products").
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are attaching more significant environmental claims to a wider array of
products. 14 Such an evolution in green marketing claims suggests that
the FTC may no longer want to sit back and wait for this issue to resolve
itself.
In 2007, TerraChoice Environmental Marketing, a Canadian environmental organization,' 5 conducted a study concerning the presence of
greenwashing in various product markets, concluding that out of 1018
consumer products and the 1753 environmental claims each of these
products contained, every claim except one either misled or blatantly
deceived the public.' 6 Through its study, TerraChoice categorized
claims into six distinct "sins of
deceptive environmental
17
greenwashing."'
TerraChoice determined that the first of these "sins," that of the
"hidden trade-off' is the most commonly committed. 18 Businesses commit this sin by claiming that their product is "green," despite the fact that
the product may have just one "green" attribute, masking the more
harmful effects the product has on the environment.' 9
As an example, consider Fiji Water's claim that consumers who
purchase their bottled water are assisting in the reduction of carbon
levels released into the environment. 2 ° What Fiji has failed to inform
consumers is that purchasing Fiji water is not in itself a means of reducing carbon emissions, but rather that Fiji, as a corporation, has begun
purchasing carbon offsets in recent years.2 ' Many consumers would
remain indifferent to this technicality, but that does not lessen the impact
of the distinction itself on consumers who would prefer to purchase their
bottled water in an environmentally friendly form, as opposed to
purchasing their bottled water from a company that pays for the opportunity to not engage in "green" practices.2 2
TerraChoice next found that twenty-six percent of environmental
claims committed the "sin" of "no proof," essentially including busi14. See Lamb, supra note 2.
15. Terrachoice describes itself as "North America's premier environmental marketing
agency . . . . A science-based marketing firm, . . . [that helps] clients convert genuine
environmental leadership into winning strategy, communications and positioning"). See
Terrachoice, http://www.terrachoice.com/ (last visited May 30, 2010).
16. TERRACHOICE ENVTL. MKTG., THE "SIX SINS OF GREENWASHING" A STUDY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS INNORTH AMERICAN CONSUMER MARKETS 1 (2007), available at http://
www.terrachoice.com/files/6-sins.pdf. See Ellison, supra note 9, at A4.
17. TERRACHOICE ENVTL. MKTG., supra note 16, at 2-4.
18. Id. at 2.
19. Id.
20. Ellison, supra note 9.
21. Id.
22. For a more lengthy discussion of carbon offsets, see infra Part IV.D.
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nesses that made unsubstantiated environmental claims concerning their
products while lacking a foundation in scientific evidence. 23 Such greenwashing claims in the automotive industry have become so common that
some have coined the term "hollow hybrid" to refer to cars that
automakers advertise as fuel-efficient, when in reality they are no more
so than the non-hybrid versions of the same vehicle.24 Roughly fifty
percent of all cars marketed as hybrids are arguably "hollow" because
they lack "a battery that boosts the combustion engine" as well as "the
efficiency to warrant the designation."2 5
Businesses committed TerraChoice's third greenwashing "sin" of
"vagueness" in eleven percent of their environmental claims by ambiguously describing their products, referencing generic environmental
causes in their products, and subtly depicting their products as ecofriendly. 26 For instance, standard greenwashed food products typically
include on their packaging natural background settings, animals, "homemade" or "family-owned" types of labeling, references to environmental
causes, and
varied uses of environmentally evocative phrases, such as
"organic. ' 27 The United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA")
enforces standards for the labeling of certain products as "organic" pursuant to the Organic Foods Product Act ("OFPA"), 28 but the OFPA,
2' 9
however, does not aim to regulate all products labeled "organic.
Finally, when it came to TerraChoice's remaining three "sins" of
greenwashing, businesses committed these far less frequently. 30 TerraChoice discovered that a mere seven percent of environmental claims
committed the "sins" of "irrelevance," which included providing accurate environmental information of no use to consumers; "lesser of two
evils," which comprised organic versions of considerably harmful products such as cigarettes; and "fibbing," or providing blatantly false environmental claims. 3 1 TerraChoice uncovered patent deception in a mere
one percent of the products studied, suggesting that any developing regulatory framework should not operate under traditional deceptive-adver23. TERRACHOICE ENVTL. MKTG., supra note 16, at 3.
24. Ellison, supra note 9.
25. TERRACHOICE ENVTL. MKTG., supra note 16, at 3.

26. Id.
27. See Severson, supra note 5.
28. See 7 U.S.C. § 6501 (2006).
29. See 65 Fed. Reg. 80,548 (Dec. 21, 2000). For instance, the USDA does not regulate
businesses that label personal care products as "organic." See All One God Faith, Inc. v. Hain
Celestial Group, Inc., No. C 09-03517 JF (HRL), 2009 WL 4907433, at *2-4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14,
2009).
30. TERRACHOICE ENVT. MKTG., supra note 16, at 2.
31. Id.at 4.
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tising principles.3 2
The downpour of "green" advertising is difficult to miss as consumers currently find themselves unable to escape "green" marketing in
the most unexpected arenas.3 3 Toymakers, such as Mattel, have recently
begun advertising a new line of Barbie accessories, marketed toward
eco-conscious girls.3 4 The dilemma arises in that no matter how a child
dresses her Barbie, in the end Barbie is still a plastic doll, and not particularly eco-friendly.3 5 Before long "Cap'n Crunch [will] show[ ] up in a
hemp jacket, raising money to save the manatees. 3 6
Not only have advertisers hitched themselves to the "green" bandwagon, but the trend in "green" marketing has gone considerably further
with even the Princeton Review adding a "green rating" to its annual
guide for ranking colleges and universities. 37 In 2008, the Princeton
Review conducted a survey of more than 10,000 college applicants only
to find that sixty-three percent of these applicants considered "a college's commitment to the environment" as a key factor in determining
which school they would eventually attend.3 8 As a result, greenwashing
may soon exist on an entirely unprecedented scale with the Princeton
Review granting universities higher ratings based on the effectiveness of
3
a university's "green" claims. 1
B.

Greenwashing's Threat to Eco-friendly Consumerism

Concerns over the means of regulating greenwashing have recently
heightened mainly because "[gireen marketing terms remain ill-defined,
and no successful attempt has yet been made to codify what advertisers
can or cannot say when trying to promote goods with environmental
benefits."4 Governments, environmental organizations, and consumer
organizations continually disagree over the means of addressing the
issue, but they have reached some consensus as to the potential consequences of pervasive greenwashing, if left unchecked.4 1
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
See Majoras Remarks, supra note 13, at 1; Ellison, supra note 9.
See Dan Mitchell, Blogging Against Barbie, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2008, at C5.
Id.
Severson, supra note 5
Kate Zernike, Green, Greener, Greenest, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2008, § 6 (Magazine), at

26.

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Green Marketing-Are Your Claims Sustainable?, ENVTL. NEWS NE-rWORK, Sept. 2,
2008, http://www.enn.com/top-stories/article/38072.
41. See TERRACHOICE ENVTL. MKTG., supra note 16, at 1. See also Fed. Trade Comm'n,
Green Packaging Claims Workshop 13 (Apr. 30, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/
workshops/packaging/transcript.pdf [hereinafter Green Packaging Claims] (explaining that
"advertisers who are willing to stake their efforts and reputations in making claims about product
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A British monitoring organization, the Advertising Standards
Authority, recently determined that consumer complaints related to environmental advertising had risen in Britain from 117 complaints regarding 83 ads in 2006 to 561 complaints regarding 410 ads in 2007.42 A
similar organization based across Europe, the European Advertising
Standards Alliance, further concluded that similar trends have developed
in Belgium and the Netherlands, especially in relation to the automotive
industry.4 3

But businesses consistently maintain that by making environmental
claims concerning their products, they are actually benefiting consumers44 by providing consumers with the ability to better "differentiate
between products in the market. '' 45 With this purchasing decision lever-

age, consumers can drive the market toward investing "in more sustainable environmental practices.

46

Significant amounts of deceptive environmental advertising, however, may instead guide previously misled consumers to become wary of
all environmental product claims .47 A recent study found that forty-three
efficacy ought to be ensured that individuals who do not abide by these norms will not, in effect,
pollute the marketplace for truthful information").
42. Green Marketing-Are Your Claims Sustainable?, supra note 40.
43. Id.
44. Canadian Standards Ass'n, PLUS 14021-Environmental Claims: A Guide for Industry
and Advertisers, June 23, 2008, http://www.csa.ca/products/environment/Default.asp?articlelD=
9278&language=English.
45. Id. See also Kirsten H. Engel, The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market Based
Environmental Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation,26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 243, 317-18
(1999) ("Green marketing is premised on the idea that fully informed consumers will switch to
less polluting and habitat-destroying products. As a consequence, it is believed, producers will
shift their purchases away from environmentally destructive production processes and toward
environmentally benign processes because environmental consciousness will be more
profitable.").
46. Canadian Standards Ass'n, supra note 44.
47. See Green Packaging Claims, supra note 41, at 13. Concerns over consumer trust are
warranted as the Business for Social Responsibility has explained:
Whether real or perceived, when consumers see greenwashing, they are likely to
punish companies with less sales. When NGOs see it, they are motivated to drive
negative campaigns and press. And when regulators see it, they can determine that
an environmental claim is a "deceptive practice" and fine companies. The problem
should be a concern to all companies, because even if your company is not singled
out, greenwashing by your competitors hurts your industry. The more companies are
seen as greenwashing, the less likely customers are to trust environmental-related
claims in general, and the more likely regulators are to step in and impose
restrictions.
COMMUNICATIONS,
& FUTERRA SUSTAINABILITY
FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING GREENWASH: A BUSINESS GUIDE 3 (2009), availableat https://
BUSINESS

mywebspace.wisc.edu/tleggert/Sustainability%2OWebsitelUnderstanding%20and%20Preventing
%20Greenwash.pdf?uniq=-malmwb [hereinafter GREENwAsH: A BusINESs GUIDE]. See also
OGILVYEARTH, FROM GREENWASH TO GREAT 2 (2010), available at http://assets.ogilvy.com/
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percent of consumers believe that products featuring environmental
attributes are of a "higher quality" than other products,48 suggesting that

consumers-for the most part-still trust environmental marketing
claims and may be basing their purchasing decisions on such claims. But
such trust may be short-lived.
A national study, conducted by Shelton Group, an agency specializ-

ing in "energy efficiency and sustainability," recently found that forty
percent of people surveyed reacted negatively or indifferently to the
media's current coverage related to the environment.4 9 The study further
concluded that the average consumer is unaware of environmental concerns and lacks sufficient knowledge to competently assess products for
their environmental merit.50 When asked to define the components of an
environmentally friendly cleaning product, consumers surveyed correctly identified that the product should not contain "toxic ingredients,"
but simultaneously and incorrectly affirmed that the product's packaging

should be recyclable. 51 This lack of knowledge concerning environmental claims was accompanied by a growing cynicism toward such claims,
as forty-seven percent of consumers surveyed cited that most businesses
were engaging in "green" practices for the sole purpose of creating a
more favorable corporate image. 2 The concern remains that cynicism
toward environmental claims, along with scarcity of information may
eventually deter consumers from purchasing "green" products.
III.

THE RISE AND FALL OF GREENWASHING

History seems to be repeating itself when it comes to greenwashing, but that does not mean that past solutions are the most effective way
to tackle the problem. The current situation and rise in "green" advertising closely parallels a similar trend that took place in the mid 1990s. In
order to fully understand how legislatures, courts, or regulatory agencies
truffles-email/ogilvyeartlVGreenwashDigital.pdf (arguing that greenwashing "is insidiouseroding consumer trust, contaminating the credibility of all sustainability related marketing").
48. SUSTALNCOMMWORLD, THE GREEN OUTLOOK 3 (2009), available at http://www.sustain
commworld.com/pdfs/TheGreen_OutlookBrochureAppleton.pdf. The study further found that
despite the economic recession, slightly over forty percent of businesses planned to "increase
spending on green marketing in 2009" while an overwhelming majority of consumers persisted in
purchasing green products, Id.
49. Becky Ebenkamp, Study: "Green" Products Leave Consumers Puzzled, BRANDWEEK
USA, July 15, 2008, http://www.greenwashreport.orgIarticlel50708.
50. Id.
51. Id. The FTC expects that a general environmental benefit claim, such as the claim that a
product is environmentally friendly will suggest to consumers that the product does not release
"significant harmful substances" into the environment. Guides for the Use of Environmental
Marketing Claims, 16 C.F.R. § 260.7(a) (2009). There is no suggestion, however, that such a
claim indicates a product's level of recyclability.
52. Ebenkamp, supra note 49.
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should address the current greenwashing movement, one must have a
working knowledge of how these actors addressed the issue when it first
manifested itself.
This part examines the structural and societal parallels between a
period in the mid 1990s when greenwashing claims were prevalent and
the current trend in greenwashing. Part II.A addresses the varying ways
by which commentators have defined and redefined the term "greenwashing," displaying the term's evolution over the past two decades.
Part II.B provides a chronology of FTC and state reactions to pervasive
greenwashing in the 1990s, describing any interaction between regulatory frameworks. Part II.C chronicles the past decade of FTC dormancy
in the midst of state action over environmental marketing claims.
A.

Redefining "Greenwashing"-Evolution of the Term

The term "greenwash" has evolved considerably over the past two
decades, eventually dropping the more sinister connotation held in this
article's initial definition of the term. 53 TerraChoice currently defines
greenwashing as "the act of misleading consumers regarding the environmental practices of a company or the environmental benefits of a
product or service."" Others have referred to greenwashing as "the
increasingly common corporate practice of making dubious environmental claims that are more about marketing than saving the planet."5 5
Based on these definitions, one should note that the term has substantially evolved. The definition no longer assumes that the greenwashed product will harm the environment, but rather that the product
may not offer the benefit to the environment that it claims to provide.
The very fact that commentators 56 have chosen to no longer define
53. See discussion supra INTRODUCTION. See also June Camille Bush Raines, Note, The
Green Giant: EnvironmentalMarketing Claims, 45 OKLA. L. REv. 689, 689-92 (1992) (referring
to greenwashing as "greenscam"); Hoch & Franz, supra note 1, at 441 (referring to greenwashing
as "greensleeze" and "eco-pomography" because the greenwashed product may harm the
environment); Roger D. Wynne, Note, Defining Green: Toward Regulation of Environmental
Marketing Claims, 24 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 785, 787 (1991) (explaining that some companies
"fabricate the environmental qualities of their goods, letting their advertising rhetoric far outstrip
their environmental contributions"); Thomas C. Downs, Comment, "Environmentally Friendly"
Product Advertising: Its Future Requires a New Regulatory Authority, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 155,
164 (1992) (reasoning that "[s]ome green claims appear merely to take advantage of consumers'
environmental consciousness without offering any true environmental benefits").
54. TERRACHOICE ENVT. MKTG., supra note 16, at 1.
55. Mitchell, supra note 34.
56. GREENWASH: A BUSINESS GUIDE, supra note 47, at 6 (2009) (defining "greenwash" as
"doing more for the environment than you really are"); CORPWATCH, GREENWASH 101 FACT
SHEET 1, (2010), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/corpwatch.org/downloads/Greenwash%20
101%20FactSheet_Jan2010_l.pdf (defining "greenwash" as "disinformation disseminated by an
organization so as to present an environmentally responsible image").
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greenwashing in terms of intent may suggest that the FTC's design for
enforcing environmental marketing claims5" may be somewhat outdated.
If society has chosen to redefine greenwashing as something broader
than intentionally deceiving the consuming public into purchasing products that consumers believe to be environmentally friendly, but that fail
to live up to those expectations, then the FTC needs to redefine its vision
of environmental marketing enforcement actions as well.
B.

The First "Green" Wave Hits: 1990-1999

In the 1990s, the problem of deceptive environmental labeling of
products led consumers and businesses alike to look to the FTC for
redress.5 8 The FTC noted a growing consumer preoccupation with products' "green" qualities since the 1980s and leading into the 1990s.5 9 The
FTC, however, was not the only one to notice; businesses realized the
growing consumer demand for environmentally friendly products and
responded.6 °
Not surprisingly, as businesses began making environmental claims

about their products to meet consumer demand, the FTC became aware
that such claims could be particularly misleading because their subject
matter allowed for little consumer verifiability. 6 ' For example, consumers cannot readily determine whether a product they are purchasing is
"green" because "green" is a subjective, undefined term. In addition,
determining whether an environmental claim is deceptive under traditional standards is no easy task because some businesses are making
57. 16 C.F.R. § 260 (2009).
58. See Hoch & Franz, supra note 1, at 443. See also Letter from Joan Z. Bernstein, Dir.,
Bureau of Consumer Prot., to Michael J. Machado, Assembly Member, Cal. Legislature, Apr. 7,
1997, available at www.ftc.gov/be/v9700003.shtm [hereinafter Letter to Machado] (explaining
that in the early 1990s "business, industry, consumer groups, and the state Attorneys General...
petitioned the Commission to provide national industry-wide guidance to reduce consumer
deception and skepticism, in order to promote the use of truthful and substantiated environmental
marketing claims").
59. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, FED. TRADE COMM'N 1995 ANNUAL REPORT 16-17 (1995),
availableat http://www.ftc.gov/os/annualreports/ar1995.pdf [hereinafter FTC IN 1995]; Roscoe B.
Starek, Il, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, A Brief Review of the FTC's Environmental and Food
Advertising Enforcement Programs (Oct. 13, 1995), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/
starek/rbsgre.shtm [hereinafter A Brief Review] (summarizing the results of consumer polls as
finding three general trends: Consumers chose not to buy products they believed would harm the
environment, consumers bought products "specifically because of environmental advertising or
labeling," and consumers paid more for such products).
60. See FTC LN1994, supra note 7, at 20 (explaining that "new product introductions have
kept pace with" growing consumer eco-consciousness).
61. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, FED TRADE COMM'N 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 2, 11 (1991),

available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/annualreports/arl991.pdf [hereinafter FTC IN 1991]; A Brief
Review, supra note 59 ("[I]t seemed that many of the [environmental] claims were exaggerated"
as consumers and environmental groups voiced their concerns that "there wasn't much truth in
environmental advertising.").
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long-term environmental claims, the effects of which consumers will not
know for decades.62
In 1991, the FTC brought its first two environmental marketing
actions against businesses making unsubstantiated "ozone-safety claims"
and obtained consent agreements in each case.63 That same year the
FTC, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), and the United

States Office of Consumer Affairs formed, essentially, a greenwashing
task force. Aware of the potential fallout to businesses from strict and

inconsistent regulation of environmental marketing, the FTC sought to
balance consumer empowerment with "protection of business from conflicting state regulations."' The FTC had realized that its enforcement
actions were insufficient to tackle the greenwashing problem.6 5 As the

FTC grew more aware of the deceptive environmental marketing problem, so did certain state legislatures, which also attempted to address
such claims.6 6
What eventually resulted from mounting pressures 6 7 was a soft

approach to regulating deceptive environmental advertising in the form
of the FTC releasing its nonbinding "Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims," commonly referred to as the Green Guides. 68
The release aimed to prevent companies engaging in environmental mar-

keting from unknowingly violating section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act through a deceptive environmental claim.6 9
62. See Roscoe B. Starek, III, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Remarks Before the Alliance for
Beverage Cartons and the Environment Symposium (Dec. 4, 1996), available at www.ftc.gov/
speeches/starek/egstarek.shtm [hereinafter Starek Remarks].
63. See FTC IN 1991, supra note 61, at 2. See, e.g., Zipatone, Inc., 114 F.T.C. 376 (1991);
Jerome Russell Cosmetics, U.S.A., 114 F.T.C. 514 (1991).
64. FTC IN1991, supra note 61, at 11.
65. See A Brief Review, supra note 59.
66. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17508.5 (West Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 245-17-1 to -14 (Burns Supp. 1992); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-0717.2 (McKinney 1992).

67. Starek Remarks, supra note 62. (stating that in the early 1990s the FTC "began to hear
reports of uncertainty by businesses and advertisers about the potential development of differing
...standards [for environmental claims] on a state by state basis" along with reports from "state
law enforcers and environmental groups [that] continued to express concern about preventing
deceptive claims").
68. See 16 C.F.R. § 260 (1996); 57 Fed. Reg. 36,363 (Aug. 13, 1992). The FTC had three
alternative means of regulating from which to choose-case by case prosecution under section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, issuing interpretive guidelines, and issuing binding trade
regulation rules. See 56 Fed. Reg. 24,968 (May 3, 1991). Of these, the FTC opted for the second
alternative.
69. See FED TRADE COMM'N, FED TRADE COMM'N 1992 ANNUAL REPORT 1, 13 (1992),

available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/annualreports/arl992.pdf [hereinafter FTC IN 1992]
(describing the Green Guides as nobly intended "to protect consumers and to bolster their
confidence in environmental claims, and to reduce manufacturers' uncertainty about which claims
might lead to Commission law enforcement actions, thereby encouraging marketers to produce
and promote products that are less harmful to the environment"); Hoch & Franz, supra note 1, at
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The FTC's Green Guides may be viewed as "the primary tool in
federal regulation of green advertising."' The Green Guides apply to
"environmental claims included in labeling, advertising, promotional
materials and all other forms of marketing," a seemingly broad scope of
reach for the Guides.7 1
Within its mission to protect consumers from "deceptive, unsubstantiated, or unfair advertising," 7 2 the FTC began consistently enforcing
environmental marketing actions in 1993. 7 1 By 1994, the FTC considered such claims "rapidly evolving. 7 4 In response to the steady flow of
environmental marketing, the FTC began its first official review of the
Green Guides in 1996, eventually finding the Guides "effective in
preventing deception and encouraging truthful claims. '7 5 The FTC specifically noted the Guides' success in terms of solicited comments:
[T]he guides benefit consumers by stemming the tide of spurious
environmental claims; bolster consumer confidence; increase the
flow of specific and accurate environmental information to consumers, enabling them to make informed purchasing decisions; and
encourage manufacturers to improve the environment characteristics
of their products and packaging....
[T]he guides benefit industry by providing uniform, consistent
guidance regarding the making of non-deceptive environmental
claims; promoting national consistency in the treatment of environmental marketing claims; assisting advertisers in determining what
claims would likely lead to Commission challenge; ... and allowing
flexibility for manufacturers to improve the environmental attributes
and to communicate those improvements to
of their products
76
consumers.

444. In 1992, the FTC noted a correlation between consumer "concerns with the environment"
and "deceptive [environmental] claims." FTC IN 1991, supra note 61, at 16. See also Starek
Remarks, supra note 62. (explaining that the FTC expected to improve consumer purchasing
power by providing businesses with safe harbors for their environmental marketing claims). The
Guides' safe-harbor approach allows businesses to make objectively genuine environmental
claims about their products without fear of repercussion. As a result, the market should take note
of these consumer preferences. See id.
70. Gregory Bibler, Making the Case for Your Green Marketing Claims, MONDAQ Bus.
BRIEING, Sept. 22, 2008 at 2, available at 2008 WLNR 18283499.
71. 16 C.F.R. § 260.2 (2009). For a detailed discussion of the Green Guides, see infra Part
IV.B.
72. FTC IN 1994, supra note 7, at 19.
73. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, FED. TRADE COMM'N 1993 ANNUAL REPORT 13 (1993),
[hereinafter FTC IN 1993]
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/annualreports/ar1993.pdf
(describing that "many of the [FTC's] consent orders . . . involved environmental claims" in
1993).
74. FTC IN 1994, supra note 7, at 19.
75. FED. TRADE COMM'N, FED. TRADE COMM'N 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 19 (1996), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/annualreports/ar1994.pdf [hereinafter FTC IN 1996].
76. 61 Fed. Reg. 53,311, 53,312 (Oct. 11, 1996).
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A University of Utah study, conducted between the initial release
of the Guides and the FTC's subsequent review of them, determined that

businesses attached more environmental claims to their products
between 1992 and 1994 than in previous years.77 The study further
found that since the release of the Guides businesses had "improved
[the] quality" of their environmental claims through greater specificity
and qualification. 78 In a sense this was a success for the FTC, which had
chosen a soft regulatory approach to environmental marketing, fearing
that a stricter regulatory framework would discourage businesses from
designing green products despite consumer demand.79 Such perceived
success contributed to the FTC's decision to lightly revise the Guides in

1998 only to reflect "the emergence of new claims."8
By choosing to strike with a subtle attack on greenwashing-determining the need for and means of regulation on a case-by-case basisthe FTC set up a pattern for how government agencies, as well as legislatures, would address later greenwashing concerns. 8 Perhaps the FTC
took a passive approach to enforcing environmental marketing actions

because of the way in which society had then chosen to define greenwashing. With commentators in the mid 1990s taking the view that businesses were intentionally greenwashing consumers, the FTC may have
reasoned that enforcement actions against businesses for deceptive environmental claims could easily taint a business's reputation indefinitely.
Despite the safe harbors provided in the Guides, the FTC still managed

to prosecute more than thirty environmental marketing claims-under
the Federal Trade Commission Act-throughout the 1990s.8 3
77. R.N. MAYER ET AL., TRENDS IN ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETING CLAIMS SINCE THE FTC
GUIDES: TECHNICAL REPORT (1995) (the study audited product brands for two years and across
sixteen geographically diverse grocery stores).
78. Id.
79. See Letter to Machado, supra note 58.
80. FED. TRADE COMM'N, FED. TRADE COMM'N 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 31 (1997), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/annualreports/ar1997.pdf [hereinafter FTC IN 1997] (newly covered
terms included "environmentally preferable," "nontoxic," and "chlorine-free").
81. Id.
82. See sources cited supra note 53.
83. See, e.g., Zipatone, Inc., 114 F.T.C. 376 (1991) (ozone-safety claims); Jerome Russell
Cosmetics, U.S.A., 114 F.T.C. 514 (1991) (ozone-safety claims); First Brands Corp., 115 F.T.C. 1
(1992) (degradability claims); Am. Enviro Prods., Inc., 115 F.T.C. 399 (1992) (degradability
claims); Tech Spray, Inc., 115 F.T.C. 433 (1992) (ozone-safety claims); RMed Int'l, Inc., 115
F.T.C. 572 (1992) (degradability claims); Mobil Oil Corp., 116 F.T.C. 113 (1993) (degradability
claims); Perfectdata Corp., 116 F.T.C. 679 (1993) (ozone-safety claims); Demert & Dougherty,
Inc., 116 F.T.C. 841 (1993) (general environmental-benefit claims); Nationwide Indus., Inc., 116
F.T.C. 853 (1993) (ozone-safety and general environmental-benefit claims); Texwipe Co., 116
F.T.C. 1169 (1993) (general environmental-benefit claims); G.C. Thorsen, Inc., 116 F.T.C. 1179
(1993) (ozone-safety claims); White Castle Sys., Inc., 117 F.T.C. 1 (1994) (recyclability claims);
Redmond Prods., Inc., 117 F.T.C. 71 (1994) (general environmental-benefit claims); Mr. Coffee,
Inc., 117 F.T.C. 156 (1994) (general environmental-benefit claims); Archer Daniels Midland Co.,
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A Decade of Dormancy for the FTC: 2000-2009

Most likely in response to a hostile political climate, the FTC
ceased active enforcement of environmental marketing claims by 2001.
The decade witnessed, essentially, no FTC activity in the area of environmental marketing. Although the FTC need only review its Green
Guides every ten years-meaning that a review was not officially due
until 2009-the FTC had previously begun review of the Guides only
three years after their initial release. 84
The reason behind such a period of FTC dormancy matters to the
extent that consumers need a reliable means of enforcing deceptive environmental marketing claims, and businesses need some form of consistent regulatory guidance to keep pace with marketing trends and
developments. If consumers can only rely on the FTC to enforce greenwashing claims within a certain political climate, then such a remedy is
hardly viable. Similarly, businesses proceeding currently without any
guidance as to their new environmental claims face great uncertainty
should the FTC suddenly awaken with a series of enforcement actions
based on these new claims. At the same time, state regulatory action in
this field has varied, with a significant number of states incorporating
the Green Guides into their own law by providing their state's attorney
general with power to bring an action against a party violating the statute,85 and further with Indiana providing a private cause of action for
117 F.T.C. 403 (1994) (degradability claims); Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc., 117 F.T.C. 747
(1994) (general environmental-benefit claims); Ams. Favorite Chicken Co., 118 F.T.C. 1 (1994)
(general environmental- benefit and recyclability claims); Lepage's, Inc., 118 F.T.C. 31 (1994)
(recyclability and degradability claims); Oak Hill Indus., Corp., 118 F.T.C. 44 (1994) (general
environmental-benefit and recyclability claims); AJM Packaging Corp., 118 F.T.C. 56 (1994)
(general environmental-benefit and recyclability claims); Keyes Fibre Co., 118 F.T.C. 150 (1994)
(degradability and general environmental-benefit claims); Amoco Chem. Co., 118 F.T.C. 194
(1994) (recyclability and general environmental benefit claims); In re N. Am. Plastics Corp., 118
F.T.C. 632 (1994) (degradability claims); BPI Envt'l, Inc., 118 F.T.C. 930 (1994) (degradability
claims); Chemopharm Laboratory, Inc., 118 F.T.C. 1195 (1994) (general environmental-benefit
claims); Creative Aerosol Corp., 119 F.T.C. 13 (1995) (ozone-safety and recyclability claims);
Mattel, Inc., 119 F.T.C. 969 (1995) (ozone-safety claims); Safe Brands Corp., 121 F.T.C. 379
(1996) (general environmental-benefit and recyclability claims); Amoco Oil Co., 121 F.T.C. 561
(1996) (general environmental-benefit claims); Benckiser Cons. Prods., Inc., 121 F.T.C. 644
(1996) (environmental donation claim); RBR Prods., Inc., C-3696 (Dec. 1996) (ozone-safety
claims); Blue Coral, Inc., D-9280 (July 1997) (general environmental-benefit claims); Tradenet
Mktg., Inc., X990063 (Apr. 1999) (general environmental-benefit claims); OneSource Worldwide
Network, Inc., X990067 (July 1999) (general environmental-benefit claims).
84. See discussion supra Part III.B.
85. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17580.5 (West 2010) (explicitly incorporating the
Green Guides); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-255c (2009) (adopting provisions regulating the
recyclable nature and content of product packaging); FLA. STAT. § 403.7193 (2009) (adopting
provisions for regulating environmental representations); IND. CODE § 24-5-17-2 (2009) (adopting
provisions similar to those in the Green Guides); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 2142 (2010)
(explicitly incorporating the Green Guides); 220 MASS. CODE REGS. § 11.06 (2010) (explicitly
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deceptive environmental marketing claims.8 6
After nearly a decade of inactivity, the FTC began revising the

Green Guides in 2008, in response to the dramatic increase in green
advertising 8 7 and the potential for numerous greenwashing claims.8 8
According to the FTC, such revisions are warranted because businesses
are currently making an ample number of claims over terms, such as
"carbon offsets" and "sustainability," left untouched by the current
Green Guides. 89
incorporating the Green Guides in the context of electricity generation and supply); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 445.903(l)(dd)-(ee) (2009) (explicitly incorporating the Green Guides); MINN. STAT.
§ 325E.41 (2009) (explicitly incorporating the Green Guides); N.M. CODE R. § 12.2.5 (Weil
2010) (explicitly incorporating the Green Guides in the context of discussing why environmental
marketing claims differ from standard deceptive-advertising claims); N.Y. ENVn. CONSERV. LAW
§ 27-0717 (McKinney 2010) (adopting provisions regulating the recyclable nature and content of
product packaging); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13-3.1 (2009) (explicitly incorporating the Green
Guides); 52 PA. CODE § 54.6 (2010) (explicitly incorporating the Green Guides in the context of
electricity generation and supply).
86. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 24-5-17-14(b) (2009) ("A person who suffers actual damages from
a violation of this act may bring an action to recover the actual damage."). A concern arises that as
states continue to regulate deceptive environmental-marketing, they may overly burden interstate
commerce, implicating dormant commerce clause issues. Congress's commerce clause power
under Article 1, section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution does not explicitly restrict states from
regulating particular spheres of commerce, but may prevent states from using certain means of
regulating commerce. As the Supreme Court explained in United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. OneidaHerkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 550 U.S. 330, 338 (2007): "Although the
Constitution does not in terms limit the power of States to regulate commerce, we have long
interpreted the Commerce Clause as an implicit restraint on state authority, even in the absence of
a conflicting federal statute." Whether state statutes regulating deceptive environmental-marketing
violate the dormant aspects of the commerce clause depends on whether such statutes facially
discriminate against interstate commerce. Id. Assuming a court finds that these statutes are facially
neutral, the court will uphold the statute "unless the burden imposed on interstate commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Id. at 346. Although dormant
commerce clause concerns warrant discussion, this issue is outside the scope of this article.
87. See 73 Fed. Reg. 11,371, 11,373 (Mar. 3, 2008); It's Too Easy Being Green: Defining
Fair Green Marketing Principles, Statement before the H.R. Sub. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce 111 th Cong. 1 (2009) [hereinafter It's Too Easy Being Green] (prepared statement of
the FEC) (citing a "virtual tsunami of environmental marketing" over the last few years); Fed.
Trade Comm'n, Hearing before the S. Sub. Comm. on Fin. Servs. and General Gov't Comm. on
Appropriations 110th Cong. 7 (2008) (prepared statement of the FTc) (citing a "virtual explosion
of green marketing" in 2007).
88. See It's Too Easy Being Green, supra note 87, at 1; Pares Remarks 2008, supra note 4,
at 8; Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Reviews Environmental Marketing Guides, Announces Public
Meetings, FTC.Gov, Nov. 28, 2007, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/1 l/enviro.shtm; Ellison, supra
note 9; Joseph J. Schwartz, Comment, Thinking Green or Scheming Green?: How and Why the
FTC Green Guides Should Address Corporate Claims of Environmental Sustainability, 18 PENN.
ST. ENvmL.

L. Rnv. 95, 96-97 (2009).

89. See 72 Fed. Reg. 66,091, 66,092 (Nov. 27, 2007) (explaining that following the FTC's
1998 revision of the Guides, businesses "increasingly have publicized the environmental attributes
of certain products" and are also "making new green claims"); Panes Remarks, supra note 4, at 8;
Majoras Remarks, supra note 13, at 3 (noting that "consumers now have the option to purchase
and use products that were unforeseen . . . when the FTC first developed the Guides, and
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The FTC hosted its first of three Guides revision workshops on
January 8, 2008, focusing on concerns over carbon offsets and renewable energy certificates.9 ° Each revision workshop included panel discussions featuring industry players as well as environmental organizations.
Through these workshops the FTC solicited proposals from interested
parties and discussed the consequences of FTC-proposed revisions. The
second workshop, held on April 30, 2008, focused on green packaging
claims, while the final workshop, taking place roughly two months later,
related to green building projects.9 1 Interested parties have submitted
approximately 200 comments to the FTC over the course of its revision
process, indicating both consumer and industry concern over the current
lack of guidance.9"
While the FTC's recent decision to revise its Green Guides remains
central to the growing concerns over greenwashing, the crux of this discussion rests in the connection between the FTC's revisions and FTC
enforcement actions under the Federal Trade Commission Act. At the
2008 American Conference Institute's Regulatory Summit for Advertisers and Marketers, J.Thomas Rosch, an FTC Commissioner, described
the FTC's new vision for the enforcement of deceptive environmental
marketing claims.9 3 Rosch began by explaining that although the FTC
had witnessed significant amounts of environmental marketing strategies
in the past, recent numbers were unprecedented with businesses introducing more than 300 "green" products in 2007, a five-percent increase
from 2002. 9' Rosch went on to note that the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office had processed twice as many applications for "green" products in
2007, than in 2006. 9'
However, plans for completing the revisions by early 2010 were
suddenly halted toward the end of 2008, as revision workshops reached
a standstill.9 6 In mid 2009 the FTC announced that it would conduct its
own study of "consumer perception of environmental marketing claims"
before continuing with its revisions.9 7 Somewhat ironically, despite haltconsumer perceptions of old green claims may have evolved significantly over time"); Robert S.
Huie, Establishing Green Guides, MIAMI DAILY Bus. REV., May 19, 2008, at 5.
90. See 73 Fed. Reg. 11,371, 11,373 (Mar. 3, 2008).
91. See 74 Fed. Reg. 22,396, 22,397 n.5 (May 12, 2009).
92. See It's Too Easy Being Green, supra note 87, at 4 (citing 72 Fed. Reg. 66,094 (Nov. 27,
2007), 73 Fed. Reg. 11,371 (Mar. 3, 2008), and 73 Fed. Reg. 32,662 (June 3, 2008)).
93. J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Responsible Green Marketing (June 18,
2008) available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/080618greenmarketing.pdf.
94. Id. at 2.
95. Id.
96. Brenda H. Gotanda, Corporate Sustainability Reporting: Capturing Benefits, Avoiding
Pitfalls, 240 LEGAL INTELLIGENCER 5 (2009), available at 2009 WLNR 21591827.
97. See 74 Fed. Reg. at 22,397 (The FTC plans to conduct an internet survey of 3,700
participants in order to better understand how consumers respond to general environmental-benefit
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ing Green Guides revisions, the FTC reemerged in 2009 from its decadelong slumber, by bringing a handful of enforcement actions against businesses engaging in deceptive environmental marketing."
The FTC's activities during the summer of 2009 may provide a
glimpse into what the future holds for the FTC. In a matter of months,
the FTC brought three enforcement actions against Kmart, Dyna E, and
Tender for their deceptive use of the term "biodegradable" to describe
products ranging from paper plates to dry towels. In discovering that
consumers routinely disposed of each of these products in "landfills,"
the FTC reasoned that such products were not biodegradable because
they would not "biodegrade within a reasonably short time" when disposed of in such a way. 99 Earlier that year the FTC brought false advertising claims against two car manufacturers deceptively marketing the
technology behind their hollow hybrids through statements "violat[ing]
basic scientific principles."'" °
Additionally, the FTC's view of environmental marketing is newly
centering on the theory of the "life-cycle analysis,"-examining environmental claims by "looking at the entire lifespan of a product."'0 ° To
better understand this life-cycle analysis, consider it in the context of a
hypothetical product, such as a newly designed laptop computer that
makes an environmental claim. Manufacturers of this newly "green"
laptop would likely promote the product as "green" because of a longer
battery life. A laptop promising a longer battery life should result in a
reduced consumption of batteries and therefore reduced disposal of such
batteries. Using a life-cycle analysis to determine whether the manufacturers of this laptop are making an accurate environmental claim, the
FTC would consider more than just the laptop's battery life, which is
merely relevant to the latter part of the analysis relating to the product's
disposal. Instead, the FTC would take into the account the use of "clean"
technology in the laptop's manufacturing process, the laptop's packaging, the laptop's composition, and the laptop and battery disposal rates.
claims and certain specific environment claims, such as "sustainable" and "carbon neutral."); It's
Too Easy Being Green, supra note 87, at 4 (explaining that the FTC is seeking this data to avoid
"inadvertently chill[ing]" businesses from making "useful green claims").
98. See K-mart Corp., No. 082-3186 (June 9, 2009) (biodegradability claim); Tender Corp.,
No. 082-3188 (June 9, 2009) (biodegradability claim); Dyna-E Int'l, No. 9336 (June 9, 2009)
(biodegradability claim).
99. Advertising Trends and Consumer Protection: Statement Before the S. Comm. on
Commerce, Science and Transportation, 11 th Cong. 15-16 (2009) (testimony of David Vladeck,
Dir., Fed. Trade Comm'n) [hereinafter Vladeck Testimony].
100. Id. at 16 (citing FTC v. Dutchman Enterprises, LLC, et al., No. 2:09-cv-00141-FSH (D.
N.J. Jan. 14, 2009)).
101. Rosch, supra note 93, at 9.
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Environmentally friendly disposal factors may no longer sufficiently
counter environmentally harmful aspects of the manufacturing process.
Engaging in a life-cycle analysis would be a wide departure from
the FTC's original purpose under the Green Guides, which directly notes
that the Guides fail to "address claims based on a 'lifecycle' theory of
environmental benefit." 11 2 Such a departure by the FI'C may imply a
new focus for the agency.
The FTC's latest response to current greenwashing issues, 10bringing actions against businesses engaged in deceptive environmental
marketing, while stalling revisions to its Green Guides-may suggest
that the FTC has not only realized the vast scope of the current greenwashing problem, but has also accepted that a laissez-faire approach to
regulation provides little deterrent effect." The concern remains, however, that the FTC's unexpected halt to its revision process may in fact
be a signal to businesses that the FTC has further reassessed its position
in the greenwashing scheme and found the Guides an inadequate means
of addressing such a pervasive problem. Of course, a more practical
explanation may be that the FTC has merely stalled revisions because
greenwashing is hardly a priority during a time of stifling economic
recession.

IV.

AGENCY ENFORCEMENT

This part provides a comprehensive analysis of the FTC's role in
responding to environmental-marketing claims. Part IV.A describes the
basis for the FTC's involvement in deceptive environmental-marketing
claims via the Federal Trade Commission Act. Part IV.B details the
FTC's Green Guides, including a discussion of their nonbinding nature,
basic provisions, upcoming revisions, and the expected consequences of
such revisions. Part IV.C explains how environmental-benefit claims
differ from traditional deceptive-advertising claims, while Part IV.D
describes some potential consequences of the Guides' upcoming
revisions.
A.

Claims Under the Federal Trade Commission Act

Typically, plaintiffs can seek relief from deceptive advertising by
102. 16 C.F.R. § 260.7 (2009).
103. Vladeck Testimony, supra note 99, at 15-16; Gabriel Nelson, FTC Moves May Signal
Start of 'Greenwashing' Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2010.
104. Vladeck Testimony, supra note 99, at 13 (stating that "the FTC has launched its own
green initiative, including review of its Green Guides and law enforcement actions targeting false
or deceptive claims"); Jennifer Woods, Note, Of Selling the Environment-Buyer Beware? An
Evaluation of the Proposed F.T.C. Green Guides Revisions, 21 LoY. CONSUMER L. REv. 75,
81-82 (2008).
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means of requesting an enforcement action from the FTC under section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC Act"). 0 5 The FTC
enforces deceptive-advertising actions related to food and most other
consumer products. 0 6 Section 45 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
specifically declares unlawful "[u]nfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce. '' 10 7
Authority for promulgation of rules lies in the FTC Act's grant of
power to the FTC to "define with specificity unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in particular industries."'° 8However, the FTC has not
addressed environmental-marketing claims through its rulemaking
power, choosing instead to promulgate nonbinding guides in this area.' 9
Where businesses act "inconsistent[ly] with the guides," the FTC may
bring an enforcement action under section 5 of the FTC Act, but only
where the FTC reasonably believes the businesses' actions are "deceptive" in terms of the FTC Act. 1 °
Consumers may be disadvantaged by the FTC's broad discretion
whether to carry an enforcement action forward on behalf of a consumer.l' This is further complicated by the fact that the FTC Act fails
to define "deceptive acts," leaving the FTC to make such determinations
on an individual basis.1 12 Generally, the FTC considers an act "deceptive" where the act is "likely to mislead reasonable consumers." 13 However, an advertisement's "capacity to deceive" can qualify as deceptive
under the FTC Act." 14
Over the past two decades, the FTC has prosecuted many of its
105. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 15 U.S.C. § 57a (2006).
109. 16 C.F.R. § 1.5 (2009).
110. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2006). See also Majoras Remarks, supra note 13, at 2 (stating that the
"Green Guides apply the FTC Act to environmental-advertising and marketing practices and offer
marketers general principles on how to avoid making misleading claims").
111. See 16 C.F.R. § 260.2 (2009).
112. See §45.
113. Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174 (1984).
114. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 150 F.2d 106, 109 (5th Cir. 1945) (in a
case involving livestock-insecticide spray, the court noted that: "The law is not made for the
protection of experts, but for the public-that vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the
unthinking and the credulous, who, in making purchases, do not stop to analyze, but are governed
by appearances and general impressions."); Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. Fed. Trade
Comm'n, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944); Perloff v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 150 F.2d 757 (3d Cir.
1945); Progress Tailoring Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 153 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1946); Goodman v.
Fed. Trade Comm'n, 244 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1957); Thiret v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 512 F.2d 176
(10th Cir. 1975).
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environmental-marketing actions in terms of lack of substantiation.' 5
Because consumers cannot easily verify environmental claims, the
FTC's preoccupation with substantiation actions is warranted. For a business to make a claim that the FTC does not deem deceptive, the business must possess a "reasonable basis" for the claim.'6 For
up such
environmental claims, the FTC requires that businesses back
17
claims with "competent and reliable scientific evidence."' '
In deciding whether to bring an action against a party for "unfair or
deceptive acts," the FTC will consider various factors; namely, the likelihood that a particular claim would "mislead" a "reasonable consumer,"
and the materiality of a particular claim." 8 Even if a claim is literally
true, the FTC may still bring an action for deceptive advertising against
the business depending on what consumers infer from the claim. Consumers who read "please recycle" on the back of a paper plate may
assume that the statement is an environmental claim, suggesting that the
consumer can readily recycle the product. The FTC views such claims,
if unqualified, as deceptive because although paper plates are objectively
recyclable, the claim implies that consumers will be able to recycle them
in their communities, when in fact most communities do not offer
recycling facilities for paper products once contaminated by food.'I 9
Businesses charged with deceptive advertising or marketing under
defend on the basis that their product claim was mere
section 5 may
"puffery."' 120 In a leading case, Carlay Company, makers of a weightloss plan claimed that "removal of excess weight through the use of the
product was easy."'' 2 The FTC argued this claim was deceptive under
section 5 because evidence suggested that weight loss through the product and use of the plan was not easy. The Seventh Circuit disagreed,
determining that the "term [easy] is one of... relative connotation" and
"justifiable[] under the circumstances, under those cases recognizing
that such words 'easy,' 'perfect,' 'amazing,' 'prime,' 'wonderful,'
'excellent,' are regarded in law as mere puffing or dealer's talk upon
115. See discussion supra Part III.B.

116. See Starek Remarks, supra note 62.
117. Id. (the standard is that "any supporting test, analysis, research, study, or other evidence
based on the expertise of professionals in the relevant area must be conducted and evaluated in an
objective manner by persons qualified to do so, using procedures generally accepted in the
profession to yield accurate and reliable results").
118. See id. (commonly prosecuted claims include instances where businesses have "implied
too much" through an environmental claim or have "exaggerated the environmental benefits of
their products").
119. See id.

120. Puffery is "an expression of opinion relating to value." Vavricka v. Mid-Continent Co., 8
N.W.2d 674, 679 (Neb. 1943).
121. Carlay Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 153 F.2d 493, 494-95(1946).
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which no charge of misrepresentation can be based."' 22 Puffery
defenses, specifically, may prove problematic in the context of environ-

mental marketing claims. 123
B.

The Green Guides and their Connection to the FTC Act

The FTC "employs a multi-tiered approach" to tackling deceptive
environmental-marketing claims-creation and promulgation of the
Green Guides to steer businesses in the right direction, enforcement
actions against businesses engaged in deceptive environmental marketing, and publication of materials meant to alleviate consumer
24
confusion.
First, there is no independent enforcement under the Green Guides,
which are merely an administrative agency's nonbinding interpretation
of the law.' 25 However, if the FTC finds that a business has made a
claim that is at odds with the Green Guides, the FTC retains the option
Comof prosecuting the business under section 5 of the Federal Trade
' 26
mission Act, "which prohibits unfair or deceptive practices."'
Although some might argue that the Green Guides are fatally
flawed because of their nonbinding nature, such an interpretation ignores
the current FTC posture, which describes the Green Guides as mere
reflections of "the basic requirements that have been spelled out over the
years in FTC statements and cases for all advertising claims."'' 27 Under
this approach, the Green Guides simply reiterate binding legal principles, applied to deceptive-advertising practices, in the specific context of
environmental marketing.
Second, the FTC chose not to specifically define terms within its
Green Guides, preferring instead to provide businesses with expansive
categories in which they might safely advertise their product to consumers, without becoming entirely vulnerable to liability for deceptive
advertising-so-called safe harbors. 28 The FTC's failure to specifically
define environmental terms in its Green Guides again reinforces the idea
that the FTC viewed its role with regards to greenwashing claims as one
122. Id. at 496.
123. See discussion infra Part iv.C.
124. See It's Too Easy Being Green, supra note 87, at 1.
125. See 16 C.F.R. § 260.1 (2009); Fed. Trade Comm'n, The FTC's Green Guides, supra note
84; Lauren C. Avallone, Comment, Green Marketing: The Urgent Need for Federal Regulation,
14 PENN. ST. ENvTL. L. REv. 685, 686-87 (2006).

126. See 15 U.S.C. § 5 (2006); It's Too Easy Being Green, supra note 87, at 2.
127. Rosch, supra note 93, at 6.

128. See 16 C.F.R §§ 260.6-260.7 (2009). For a detailed discussion of these categories,
including specific examples, see infra Part IV.B.2.
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of an independent observer, attempting to regulate near the margins
without actively interfering with the conduct of business.
However, it remains unclear whether the FTC's statements concerning its Green Guides 1 29 have paralleled the FTC's conduct concerning deceptive environmental claims. What appears more likely is that
although the FTC has expressed its desire to treat greenwashing claims
in much the same way as it addresses traditional deceptive-advertising
claims, the FTC has not conducted itself in such a manner over the
13
course of the past decade. 1
1.

PRINCIPLES GUIDING ENVIRONMENTAL-MARKETING

CLAIMS

The FTC based its Green Guides on five overarching principles.
Businesses aiming to environmentally market their products in
nondeceptive ways must consider that these five principles pervade
every aspect of the Green Guides. Thus, where the Guides are currently
deficient-as in cases of new environmental claims-businesses may
still rely on these five principles for direction, 13 ' although such direction
is not nearly as clear as that provided in the Guides' safe-harbor
provisions.
Primarily, the Green Guides provide that:
any party making an express or implied claim that presents an objective assertion about the environmental attribute of a product, package
or service must, at the time the claim is made,
possess and rely upon
32
a reasonable basis substantiating the claim.'
To understand the scope of a substantiation claim, consider the following example. In 1996, the FTC brought an enforcement action against
Amoco Oil Company concerning Amoco Silver Gasoline ads, which the
FTC found to be in violation of section 5(a) of the FTC Act. 133 Amoco's
ads encouraged consumers to purchase Silver 89 octane gas for a
"cleaner environment," a claim for which Amoco "did not possess and
rely upon a reasonable basis" of evidence. 34 The FTC's order went on
to explain that regardless of whether the representations were currently
accurate, Amoco acted inappropriately in making such claims because
1 35
they were unsubstantiated at the time when Amoco released the ads.
129. Rosch, supra note 93, at 6.
130. See discussion supra Part II1.B.
131. This can be seen from the fact that TerraChoice's greenwashing sins-though pertaining
to current environmental claims-directly correlate to these five principles. See discussion supra
Part II.A.
132. 16 C.F.R. § 260.5.
133. Amoco Oil Co., 121 F.T.C. 561, 561 (1996).
134. Id. at 562.
135. Id. at 579.
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By the terms of this consent order, businesses committing TerraChoice's
"sin of no proof' would directly violate the principle of substantiation
because they do not possess reliable evidence for the claims they are
36
making. 1
The second of these principles-that of specificity-states that
"any qualifications or disclosures... should be sufficiently clear, prominent and understandable to prevent deception."' 37 The FTC derived this
principle from a decision in which a manufacturer claimed that its
"device to be used on car engines would reduce gasoline consumption."' 3 8 The problem behind the statement was its lack of qualification.
Consumers may broadly interpret such a phrase to mean that the device
significantly reduces gas consumption, when in fact, the device did so
only to a limited extent. This principle corresponds to claims that commit the "sin of vagueness" because such claims, without some kind of
qualification, are easily misunderstood by consumers.13 9
The third principle, relating to perceived lack of understanding on
the part of consumers, declares that "[a]n environmental marketing
claim should be presented in a way that makes clear whether the environmental attribute or benefit being asserted refers to the product, the
product's packaging, a service or to a portion or component of the product, package or service."' 4 0 Claims regarding a lack of understanding
will vary widely, with some businesses' claims causing far more confusion among consumers than others. In a case predating release of the
Green Guides, the FTC brought a section 5(a) action against the Vons
companies because Vons had advertised all of its food products as "pesticide-free," when in fact only some of Vons's products deserved such a
classification. The FTC noted that Vons's representations would mislead
consumers into thinking all of Vons's products were pesticide-free.'
The FTC brought this action based on general principles related to
deceptive advertising and to this day the Green Guides do not directly
address "pesticide-free" claims. This principle would most likely cover
136. TERRACHOICE ENvTL. MKTG., supra note 16, at 3. But the FTC does not currently require
businesses to provide consumers with evidence of substantiation. Instead the FTC merely requires
that such claims be substantiated. At the FTC's revision workshop on green packaging, Scot Case,
representing TerraChoice, suggested that the FTC has failed in this respect, arguing that the FTC
should encourage businesses to make such information available to consumers via required
certification, their websites, or even a toll-free informational hotline. See Green Packaging
Claims, supra note 41, at 207. Case went on to say that "if the intent of the law is to actually
facilitate marketplace environmentalism ... consumers need information to verify the accuracy of
the claims being made." Id. at 208.
137. 16 C.F.R. § 260.6 (2009).
138. Vacu-Matic Carburetor Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 38 F.T.C. 704 (1944).
139. TERRACHOICE ENVTL. MKTG., supra note 16, at 3.
140. § 260.6
141. Vons Cos., 113 F.T.C. 779, 779 (1990).
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claims that commit the "sin of the hidden trade-off' because while these
claims are not false per se, they "paint a greener picture of the product"
42
than is warranted.
The FTC addressed exaggeration in its fourth principle, explaining
that "[a]n environmental marketing claim should not be presented in a
manner that overstates the environmental attribute or benefit, expressly
or by implication."'' 4 3 Environmental marketing claims are particularly
prone to overstatement, mainly because a business's environmental
claim can be entirely accurate on its face, while simultaneously misleading consumers." 4 This principle corresponds to claims that commit the
"sin[s] of irrelevance" and "lesser of two evils" because such claims are
45
basically truthful overstatements.
In its fifth and final principle, the Guides address comparative
claims by stating that "[e[nvironmental marketing claims that include a
comparative statement should be presented in a manner that makes the
basis for the comparison sufficiently clear to avoid consumer deception."' 4 6 The FTC has traditionally enforced actions against companies
that claim that their products are superior or that make any other kind of
open-ended comparison, basing such enforcement actions on a 1958
action against Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company.' 4 7 Safe Brands
Corp., provides an example of FTC application of this principle to environmental-marketing claims. Here, the FTC maintained that Safe Brands
Corporation had violated the FTC Act by advertising its antifreeze as
"safer for the environment" than comparable products. The FfC maintained that such a statement was deceptive under section 5 because the
defendant could not substantiate that its antifreeze was safer for the
''environment generally," as opposed to being safer for certain aspects of
48
the environment.
Why would the FTC design such guiding principles, actively
enforce environmental marketing claims throughout the 1990s, and then
lay dormant for nearly a decade? These principles correspond almost
directly to the "six sins of greenwashing" that TerraChoice noted, demonstrating that the success of the Green Guides was somewhat shortlived. Standing alone the Guides may in fact provide responsible busi142. TERRACHOICE ENVTL. MKTO., supra note 16, at 2.
143. § 260.6.
144. A company may label its product as "biodegradable," where the product may in fact
biodegrade in time; however, the FTC may still consider this to be deceptive advertising if the
product fails to biodegrade for several years.
145. TERRACHOICE ENvTL. MKTcG., supra note 16, at 4.
146. § 260.6.
147. See Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 55 F.T.C. 354 (1958).
148. Safe Brands Corp., 121 F.T.C. 379, 379, 385 (1996).
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nesses with a means of safely marketing their products to environmentally-conscious consumers, but without the threat of FTC enforcement
lurking in the background, why should businesses continue to follow the
Guides' directives?
2.

CATEGORIES OF ENVIRONMENTAL-MARKETING

CLAIMS

The Green Guides address eight categories of environmental-marketing claims, providing businesses with safe harbors in each category.'" 9 Although the FTC does not enforce deceptive environmentalmarketing claims by direct reference to a business's failure to comply
with the Green Guides' safe harbors, the vast majority of these enforcement actions correlate to principles addressed in the Green Guides as
well as the Guides' specific categories.
The first of these categories is based on claims that a product pro-

vides a "general environmental benefit," explaining that "[u]nless [the]
substantiation duty can be met, broad environmental claims should
either be avoided or qualified ...to prevent deception about the specific
nature of the environmental benefit being asserted." The FTC has

viewed general-benefit claims as including terms such as "environmentally-friendly," "environmentally-preferable," and "nontoxic." 5 ' This
category is of particular significance because it best demonstrates the
reason why environmental marketing claims differ from standard deceptive-advertising claims and why the FTC is best equipped to tackle such

claims.1 5'
The remaining seven categories address specific environmental-

marketing

claims-"degradable/biodegradable/photodegradable,"'

52

149. § 260.7.
150. § 260.7(a). See, e.g., Creative Aerosol Corp., 119 F.T.C. 13 (1995) (prohibiting a soap
manufacturer from marketing its products as "environmentally safe" unless such a claim is
substantiated); Demert & Dougherty, Inc., 116 F.T.C. 841 (1993) (prohibiting a hair-care product
manufacturer from marketing its product as "environmentally safe" unless such claim is
substantiated).
151. For a detailed discussion see infra Part IV.C.
152. § 260.7(b). See, e.g., First Brands Corp., 115 F.T.C. 1 (1992) (prohibiting the
manufacturer of plastic trash bags from further marketing its product as degradable where such
manufacturer could not substantiate its claim, but providing that the manufacturer would not
violate section 5 of the FTC Act if it qualified such claims via language closely paralleling
language found in section 260.7 (b)); Am. Enviro Prods., Inc., 115 F.T.C. 399 (1992) (same,
where the claim arose over disposable diapers); RMED Int'l, Inc., 115 F.TC. 572 (1992) (same,
where the claim arose over disposable diapers).
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"compostable,"' 1 3 "recyclable,"'

tion,"' 56
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"recycled content,"' 5 5 "source reduc-

"refillable,"'' 5 7

and "ozone safe/ozone friendly"' 58-providing
businesses with numerous, nonexhaustive safe harbors for compliance
within each category.
Businesses making new environmental claims, such as claims that
their products are "sustainable" or "green," cannot rely on the Guides for
safe harbors because the Guides are simply outdated at this point. As in

the early 1990s-leading up the FTC's release of the Green Guidesenvironmental marketing is on the rise, businesses are lacking guidance,
and environmental groups are claiming that consumers are being
deceived.' 59 History suggests that the combination of these factors
should lead to FTFC action; but although the FTC proclaims its desire to
regulate such issues, businesses continue to widely advertise their lessthan-environmentally-friendly products as "green," with little interference from the FTC.
C.

Differentiating Greenwash from TraditionalDeceptive Marketing

One should not underestimate the role of the Green Guides in setting environmental-marketing claims apart from traditional deceptivemarketing claims. In some respect, it seems desirable to treat environmental-marketing claims as an undifferentiated subset of traditional
deceptive-advertising claims prosecuted under section 5. But such treatment ignores a basic distinction: General environmental-benefit claims
may constitute mere puffery under traditional section 5 analysis, and
153. § 260.7(c). See, e.g., Keyes Fibre Co., 118 F.T.C. 150 (1994) (prohibiting paper-plate
manufacturer from marketing its product as "compostable" where "only a few municipal solid
waste composting facilities" exist across the nation).
154. § 260.7(d). See, e.g., White Castle Sys., Inc., 117 F.T.C. 1 (1994) (prohibiting a fast-food
chain from claiming the recyclability of its paper packaging where "there are virtually no
collection facilities that accept food contaminated paper for recycling"); Ams. Favorite Chicken
Co., 118 F.T.C. 1 (1994) (same); Oak Hill Indus. Corp., 118 FT.C. 44 (1994) (prohibiting
manufacturer of "plastic plates, bowls, and utensils" from same).
155. § 260.7(e). See, e.g., AJM Packaging Corp., 118 F.T.C. 56 (1994) (prohibiting
disposable-plate manufacturer from claiming that its products were 100% recyclable, unless
manufacturer could substantiate).
156. § 260.7(f). See, e.g., The Vons Cos., 113 F.T.C. 779 (1990) (prohibiting pesticide
manufacturer from claiming reduced toxicity of its products unless manufacturer could
substantiate).
157. § 260.7(g).
158. § 260.7(h). See, e.g., Zipatone, 114 F.T.C. 376 (1991) (prohibiting spray manufacturer
from marketing its product as an "ecologically safe propellant" where such product contains
"ozone depleting substances"); Jerome Russell Cosmetics, U.S.A, Inc., 114 F.T.C. 514 (1991)
(prohibiting spray manufacturer from marketing its product as "ozone friendly" where such
product contains "ozone depleting substances").
159. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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much like consumers, courts lack the expertise needed to determine
whether general environmental-benefit claims are deceptive.
Puffery is excusable conduct, and the FTC may not bring a ceaseand-desist order against a company for mere puffery. In Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Federal Trade Commission, the Fifth Circuit defined "puffing" as "an
expression of opinion not made as a representation of fact."' 6 ° But while
the court simplistically defined the term, its scope is not so obvious.
Some insight may be found in the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Kirchner
v. Federal Trade Commission, where the court upheld the FTC's ceaseand-desist order, noting that "[t]he problem presented ...is not a problem of puffing . . .which, at worst, [has] no dangerous potential. If a
nonswimmer.. . equipped with a Swim-Ezy should 'swim as far as you
please,' as one of the ... advertisements invited him to do, he might
never get back."' '6 At the same time, the Seventh Circuit has added that
words of "relative connotation" such as "easy" and "prime" constitute
62
mere puffing. 1
Under this framework, courts are likely to view general nonfactual
claims as puffery so long as any lack of veracity behind such claims is
not harmful. The Green Guides do not currently address the term
"green," for instance. If the makers of a newly designed laptop computer
market their product as "green," regardless of any environmental benefit, a court following the traditional deceptive-marketing analysis may
find such marketing to constitute nonactionable puffing for three
reasons.
First, "green" is a nonfactual claim-the term in undefined. The
laptop manufacturer is therefore not making an untrue statement when
describing its product as "green" because no one can really say what
qualifies as "green." Second, "green" is a term of "relative connotation";
it is defined only in terms of comparison. The laptop may be "green" as
compared to another laptop, even if it does not benefit the environment
in a way that consumers believe a "green" laptop should. Lastly, even if
the laptop provides minimal environmental benefit, consumer reliance
on the laptop's alleged "green" attributes will not necessarily harm the
consumer in any identifiable way-except for some pocket injury if the
consumer paid more than he or she would have paid for a non-"green"
laptop.
For example, in 2006, the EPA advised DuPont and certain other
companies to discontinue their use of a carcinogen known as Perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA"), which these businesses were using to
160. 150 F.2d 106, 109 (5th Cir. 1945).
161. Kirchner v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 337 F.2d 751, 753 (9th Cir. 1964).
162. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
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make Teflon and various forms of food packaging. 1 63 As a response to
the EPA's warnings, DuPont and its fellow companies claimed the creation of a new and markedly improved "green" version of the food packaging coating. "
But not everyone is convinced that DuPont's claim is accurate,
arguing instead that because the new coating is made from the same
typically carcinogenic chemicals as PFOA, the new coating should be
1 65
equally harmful, despite the "green" claim that DuPont attached.
Investigations have determined that the only known difference between
the two chemicals at issue is that numerous studies have been performed
on PFOA, revealing its harmful effects, while there is no actual scientific data concerning the new "greener" version of the product. 6 6 One
should consider this a form of "[greenwashing-claiming environmental
benefits for a product that's little better than its replacement-at its
16 7
worst."
The Green Guides acknowledge such a concern by including a category for general environmental-benefit claims. The Guides call for qualification or avoidance of such claims in order to comply with the FTC
Act.' 6 8 The FTC may revise this portion of the Guides to include terms
such as "green."
Whereas the FIC, as a regulatory agency specializing in consumer
protection, has expertise to determine whether a general environmentalbenefit claim is deceptive, courts are far less able to do so. Courts do not
traditionally deal in elusive concepts like general environmental-benefit
claims, but are accustomed to traditional deceptive-advertising analysis,
with its focus on definable terms and verifiable claims. General environmental-benefit claims simply are not verifiable to any extent.
D.

Potential Consequences of the FTC's Upcoming
Green Guides Revisions

As the FTC potentially focuses on further regulation
Green Guides, one has to consider the possible consequences
with any changes made. In relation to carbon offsets, it is
FIC regulation will have a detrimental effect by limiting the

within its
associated
likely that
number of

163. Organic Consumers Ass'n, Credibility Gap: Toxic Chemicals in Food Packaging and
DuPont's Greenwashing, ENVTL. NEWS NETWORK, June 20, 2008, http://www.enn.com/pollution/
article/37458.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See 16 C.F.R. § 260.7(a) (2009).
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projects that businesses currently claim as producing offsets.' 69 Offsets
pose a complex problem for regulators because any measure of veracity
is speculative. To prove the validity of an offset claim, regulators must

"measure[ ] the reductions achieved through an offset project against a

projected baseline of what would have occurred in its absence."1

0

The

Government Accountability Office ("GAO") has explained that "credible offsets" must possess four qualities: (1) additionality-that each offset must reduce greenhouse gases to some extent under the projected
baseline test; (2) regulators must be able to "measure" such reductions;

(3) regulators must be able to "verif[y]" such reductions; and (4) such
reductions must be "permanent."' 7 1 Offsets present a large-scale concern

as well because U.S.-produced offsets have increased by nearly seventy
percent in the past three years with approximately
600 businesses and
72

1
organizations currently involved in the market.
If the FTC provides a narrow safe harbor for carbon offsets, perhaps as a newly added specific category in the Guides, businesses may
worry that the projects they have been supporting through offset

purchases will no longer qualify under the Guides, exposing them to

liability under the FIC Act. 173 But there is no reason to think that the
169. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO CONG. REQUESTERS: CARBON
8 (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d081048.pdf [hereinafter GAO
REPORT] (explaining that "federal oversight" of the carbon offset market "would likely increase
costs to providers," and suggesting that such oversight could eventually "stifle innovation").
Carbon offsets are defined as "measurable reduction[s] of greenhouse gas emissions from an
activity or project in one location that is used to compensate for emissions occurring elsewhere."
Id. at 1. Currently, the U.S. provides a voluntary market for carbon offsets. Id. at 4. Businesses
often use carbon offsets as a means of claiming that their product reduces greenhouse gas
emissions. The claim is not that the product itself reduces emissions, but that proceeds from the
product's sale will fund the business's purchase of carbon offsets-certificates that "purportedly
represent measurable reductions in greenhouse emissions accomplished through activities such as
methane capture or tree planting." Majoras Remarks, supra note 13, at 3-4.
170. GAO REPORT, supra note 169, at 2.
171. Id. at 2-3.
172. Id. at 9. Although the FrC and EPA have addressed some concerns over the carbon offset
market, such attempts have been limited in scope, and currently "[n]o single regulatory body
overseas the market." Id. Instead, "state fraud and consumer protection laws," as enforced by
states' attorneys general comprise a significant area of regulation in this field. Id. at 19.
173. See, e.g., Comment of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. on the Guides for the Use of Environmental
Marketing Claims 3-4 (Jan 25, 2008) (stating that the FTC "should resist the temptation to define
what constitutes an eligible offset .... Doing so would require the Commission to resolve highly
technical environmental debates that are beyond its expertise"); Comment of Hydrodec N. Am.
LLC on the Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims 1 (Jan. 25, 2008) (noting that
"the FTC should not prescribe a policy straight-jacket for additionality," but should instead focus
on an approach that "maintain[s] the incentives for new technology and other innovations that
offsets can provide"); Comment of Georgia-Pacific on the Guides for the Use of Environmental
Marketing Claims 4 (Jan. 22, 2008) (explaining that "the FTC must be very careful if this proposal
is made a rule because the dynamics of the market and technology. It could disrupt valid and
credible programs and not avoid any fraudulent activity").
OFFSETS
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FTC will create a narrow safe harbor for carbon offsets. In the case of
carbon offsets, a particular concern relates to substantiation.1 74 The specific projects may not matter as much as whether the projects supported
actually reduce carbon emissions. If the business purchasing offsets can
substantiate the claim through reliable evidence, then that should be sufficient. Further, FTC regulation of carbon offsets may in fact positively
by providing them with greater certainty that an
affect offset buyers,
175
credible.
is
offset
The fact that the FTC's Green Guides revisions might directly
interfere with significant aspects of particular industry practice may
determine whether the FTC remains inactive in prosecuting deceptive
environmental claims. The question is over the benefits of self-regulation. The FTC, in light of its concern over achieving a balance between
protecting consumers and providing businesses with flexible standards,
will likely defer to business concerns in its revisions. Otherwise, the
revisions may affect the carbon offset market in an unwanted manner.
FTC regulation on advertising and packaging of products may produce even stronger shockwaves. 176 FTC regulation will have far more
immediate effects in this area because businesses and consumers have
recently expressed significant concern over the issue of "sustainable
packaging."' 7 7 The FTC is leaning toward a requirement that would
leave products that have been certified by third parties 178 as "green" vulnerable to FT7C enforcement actions, which is likely to leave advertisers
and businesses making environmental claims with a strong feeling of
uncertainty toward their product. 79 If the FTC includes this proposal in
its new Guides, businesses relying on third-party certifications will have
a new concern-does the certification standard meet the FTC's new lifecycle approach to packaging?' 8 ° Certifiers may adapt to meet these revisions, but such adaptation may prove both costly and time-consuming, 81 leaving businesses in a bind.
174. See GAO REPORT, supra note 169, at 8. As part of its study, the GAO surveyed thirtythree carbon offset retailers based in the U.S. and found that "the information they provided about
the offsets varied considerably and offered limited assurance of credibility." Id.
175. Id. at 31-32.
176. Id.
177. Green Packaging Claims, supra note 41, at 20 (remarks by John Kalkowski, Ed.,
Packaging Digest Magazine).
178. Third-party certification is "an independent evaluation . . . which substantiate[s]
information that is being communicated." Id. at 165-66 (remarks by Cheryl Baldwin, Vice
President of Science & Standards, Green Seal).
179. Id. at 2.
180. Id. at 175-76. (remarks by John Delfausse, Vice President of Global Packaging Dev.,
Aveda Clinique).
181. Id. at 176. (explaining that conducting a "full life-cycle analysis" can cost a business
between $30,000 and $60,000 for each product).
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A further concern exists in that any addition of newly defined terms
may prove futile as businesses seek out new, undefined terms to describe
the environmental attributes of their products. As Jim Hanna, Starbuck's
Director of Environmental Impact, explained during the FTC's second
Guides revision workshop:
[Y]ou know we as marketers, and we as consumer companies, we are
the ones creating these words and defining them. For FTC to continue
to really try to put boundaries and guidelines around words is really a
reactionary way of doing things. I would rather [the FTC] put some
stakes in the ground and develop some general concepts that we can
look at and deal with . . . . [I]f [the FTC] put[s] these guidelines
around existing words, we are just going to create a new set of words
out there [the FTC] ha[s] to react to again in five
and a new lexicon
82
or ten years. '
Another potential legal fallout here exists because several states,
such as California and Indiana, have incorporated portions of the Green
Guides into their own laws,' 83 giving them binding force for the first
time. For instance, California state law provides for civil as well as criminal penalties imposed on those who engage in false advertising, as
defined by the Green Guides.' 84 Regardless of the FTC's current posture
toward enforcement of environmental claims, certain states will actively
enforce the FTC's revisions of its Green Guides, perhaps to an even
greater extent should the FTC remain dormant in this field. Essentially,
"[t]he FTC's revisions will effect a change, overnight, in the law of California and other states."'' 85 This is the case because states like California
182. Id. at 212-13.
183. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17580.5 (West 2010); IND. CODE § 24-5-17-2 (2009). See
also discussion supra Part III.C.
184. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17580.5(a) ("It is unlawful for any person to make any
untruthful, deceptive, or misleading environmental marketing claim, whether explicit or implied.
For the purpose of this section, 'environmental marketing claim' shall include any claim contained
in the 'Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims' published by the Federal Trade
Commission."). California's legislature enacted the first version of this provision in 1992, in
immediate response to the FTC's release of the Green Guides. Just this year, a California district
court denied a motion to dismiss a consumer class action, brought against S.C. Johnson & Son for
greenwashing. See Koh v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., No c-09-00927 RMW, 2010 WL 94265, at
*3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2010). The action surrounds allegations that S.C. Johnson's use of its
"Greenlist" label on Windex Products is unlawful greenwashing under California law because
S.C. Johnson designed the label "to look like a third party seal of approval, which it is not, and
[the label] falsely represents that the products are environmentally friendly." Id. at *1. The
plaintiff claimed standing because had he known that a third party had not environmentallycertified the product, he would not have purchased the product for a "premium price." Id. The
court found such an argument viable and relied directly on the Green Guides to conclude that "a
product label containing an environmental seal .. . is likely to convey to consumers that the
product is environmentally superior . . . and would be deceptive if the manufacturer cannot
substantiate this broad claim." Id. at *2.
185. Huie, supra note 89.
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have directly incorporated the entire Green Guides into their state
law. 1 86 The concern is less pronounced in states that have incorporated
portions of the Guides, 87 because only revisions to such portions of the
Guides will alter state law automatically. Similarly, revisions to the
Guides will not alter the laws of states that have created environmental
marketing laws similar in substance to the Guides, without directly
referencing the Guides in these laws. 188
Commentators also note a growing concern that the release of the
FTC's revised Green Guides will lead to a flood of new litigation. 81 9
When the FTC released its Green Guides in 1992 and 1998, the release
of the Guides also brought active FTC enforcement actions along with
them, albeit resulting in a far less proactive approach by the year
2000.190 It is extremely plausible that the FTC will revive its interest in
pursuing greenwashing claims with the upcoming release of its revised
Green Guides, particularly in light of the recent enforcement actions
brought after a decade of dormancy.' 9 ' "[T]he relative lack of enforcement actions taken by the FTC during the last eight years against deceptive environmental marketing claims may mean that, in the eyes of
plaintiffs' lawyers, the marketplace is ready for a thorough scrubbing."' 92 Due to this alarming sentiment, the concern remains that
although the FTC will target blatant greenwashers, other firms, acting in
good faith, may be caught in the crossfire.
Finally, where the FTC has remained dormant, the National Advertising Division of the Council of Better Business Bureau ("NAD") has
been actively working to interpret and adjudicate matters related to the
Green Guides as well as state environmental-marketing laws. 93 The
NAD is not a regulatory body like the FTC, but its link to the FTC is
vital. Both consumers and competitors may bring their claims before the
NAD, which "reviews national advertising for truthfulness and accu186. See also IND. CODE § 24-5-17-2 (2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13-3.1 (2009).
187. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 2142 (2010); 220 MASS. CODE REGS. § 11.06 (2010);

MICH. Come. LAWS § 445.903(l)(dd)-(ee) (2009); MINN. STAT. § 325E.41 (2009); N.M. CODE R.
§ 12.2.5 (Weil 2010); 52 PA. CODE § 54.6 (2010).
188. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-255c (2009); FLA. STAT. § 403.7193 (2009); N.Y. ENVTL.

CONSERV. LAW § 27-0717 (McKinney 2010).
189. See Bibler, supra note 70, at 6; William Sami, Greenwash Hits the Courtroom: Why the
Green Wave Now Includes Litigation, EARTH & INDUSTRY, Sept. 29, 2009, http://earthandindustry.
com/2009/09/greenwash-hits-the-courtroom-why-the-green-wave-now-includes-litigation/; Heidi
Goldstein & Emily Huggins Jones, How to Avoid Litigation Risks From Greening Your Products,
GREENBtz, May 5, 2010, http://www.greenbiz.comilblog/2010/05/05/how-avoid-litigation-risksgreening-your-products?page=full.
190. See discussion supra Part uI.B.
191. See discussion supra Part III.C.
192. Huie, supra note 89.
193. Bibler, supra note 70, at 7.
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racy." 94 If an advertiser chooses to ignore the NAD's suggestions, the
NAD may then refer the case to the FTC for enforcement. 195 The NAD

came into existence in the early 1970s, a time when the FTC exercised
lesser regulatory power in the area of consumer protection and when
"private actions brought under the Lanham Act were not as ubiquitous
as they are now."

196

In a 2007 dispute between Sony and Panasonic, the NAD issued a
compliance order advising Panasonic to cease advertising its plasma
televisions as "environmentally friendly."' 197 Similarly, in 2008, Proctor

& Gamble brought an action against the makers of Arm & Hammer
Essentials Liquid Laundry Detergent, with the NAD holding that the
company could not refer to its product as "natural."'' 98 The question
remains as to who will fill the enforcement void if the FTC fails to rise
above the waters of this current greenwashing deluge, if the recent surge

in greenwashing enforcement activity trickles away as quickly as it
materialized.' 99 It is important to note that the FTC has not delegated,
and cannot delegate any power to the NAD. Even if the NAD resolves a
dispute, the FTC may still investigate the parties involved.2" But revi-

sions to the Guides without accompanying enforcement actions may
simply lead more parties to turn to self-regulatory bodies, such as the
NAD.

V.

FEDERAL COURT INVOLVEMENT VIA THE LANHAM ACT

Closely related to these issues of government enforcement concern194. See Nat'l Adver. Div., http://www.nadreview.org/start.aspx (last visited May 26, 2010).
195. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, FTC PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE MANUAL 155
(2007). "NAD is the advertising industry's self-regulatory body for resolving disputes over truth
and accuracy in national advertising.... Though ...NAD lacks the ability to enforce decisions, it
generally refers any noncompliance to the Commission, which may choose to investigate the
alleged deceptive advertising practices." Id. at 155-56.
196. J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Self-Regulation and Consumer
Protection: A Complement to Federal Law Enforcement, Remarks Before the NAD Annual
Conference 2 (Sept. 23, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/roschl080923RoschNADSpeech.pdf [hereinafter A Complement to Federal Law].
197. Bibler, supra note 70, at 7.
198. Id.
199. The FTC has explained that self-regulation, via bodies such as the NAD, has its
advantages. The FTC, unlike the NAD, is susceptible to first amendment challenges based on its
regulation of commercial speech, as Commissioner Rosch explained: "I think constitutional issues
might also be raised in the context of 'green marketing and advertising ....' See A Complement
to Federal Law, supra note 196, at 4-5. The FTC also faces pressure from the political branches.
Id. at 10-11. Similarly, parties bringing disputes to the NAD will have such disputes resolved
within a maximum of sixty days-a quick result as compared to private litigation under section
43(a) of the Lanham Act. Id. at 12. Finally, self-regulation allows for dispute resolution by a
capable, expert body within the particular field. Id.
200. See id. at 15.
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ing greenwashing is section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 20 ' which, in pertinent part, states:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or
any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which... [ ]in commercial advertising
or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics,qualities, or
geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, services, or
commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person
who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such
20 2

act.

Section 43(a) provides a cause of action to individuals claiming
damages resulting from a business's false advertising or marketing of a
product.20 3 Commentators argue that application of section 43(a) in the
context of environmental marketing and misrepresentation could provide
private plaintiffs with a readily accessible cause of action for their seemingly remediless greenwashing claims. 2 4 This article maintains that
while such arguments are persuasive, application of the Lanham Act is
improper for particular kinds of greenwashing claims-those involving
general environmental-benefit claims.
In an era where green marketing is at an all-time high,20 5 making
greenwashing all the more likely, and where the FTC has minimized its
enforcement actions,20 6 it is not unreasonable to suggest that consumers
need to find a new kind of remedy for cases where their interests are
sufficiently harmed. Although litigants have not yet invoked the Lanham
Act to resolve a dispute over greenwashing, it is only a matter of time
before litigants realize the potential benefits of bringing their greenwashing claims under the provisions of section 43(a). Whether such a
shift in Lanham Act jurisprudence is advisable remains to be
determined.
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 20 7 is best viewed as an amalgam
and culmination of various federal laws related to unfair competition.20 8
201. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006).
202. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (emphasis added).
203. See id.
204. See Bibler, supra note 70; Robert White, Note, Preemption in Green Marketing: The
Case for Uniform Federal Marketing Definitions, 85 IND. L.J. 325, 330-31 (2010); Jacob Vos,
Note, Actions Speak Louder Than Words: Greenwashing in CorporateAmerica, 23 NOTRE DAME
J.L. Ermics & PuB. PoL'Y 673,692-93 (2009); Susan J. Sadler, Environmental Law: Got Green?,
88 MICH. BAR J. 38, 39 (2009).
205. See discussion supra Part II.
206. See discussion supra Part II1.C.
207. § 1125(a)(1)(B).

208. S. REP. No. 100-515, at 5603 (1988). For a clear discussion of Congress's purpose behind

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

1388

[Vol. 64:1353

Courts typically view the Lanham Act as a remedial statute, broadly
interpreting its provisions.2" 9 Such a history and purpose argue in favor
of further expanding the Lanham Act's scope to include claims for
deceptive "green" marketing, despite the potential collision with FTC
enforcement actions.
This part addresses a scenario in which the FTC chooses to remain
inactive with regards to environmental-marketing claims, proposing that
federal courts may step in by virtue of the Lanham Act. Part V.A
describes a primary concern over Lanham Act application to greenwashing claims-categorization-and argues that general environmentalbenefit claims are ill-suited for Lanham Act analysis. Part V.B examines
a limitation on Lanham Act claims-competing interpretations of the
Lanham Act's standing provision. Part V.C concludes by presenting
arguments as to why the courts should remain uninvolved with regards
to deceptive general environmental-benefit claims.
A.

Concerns over General Application of the Lanham Act

Most relevantly section 43(a) of the Lanham Act prohibits "false or
misleading description of fact ...[or] representation of fact, which...
[]in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics,qualities.., of [a] person's goods, services, or commercial activities ....,2 Originally, Congress did not anticipate the wide
array of applications available to the Lanham Act, and courts were reluctant to apply the cause of action to claims related to false advertising. 2 t '
Courts have interpreted the Lanham Act as a means of regulating commercial speech where such speech leads to a "misleading representation
of fact. 212 Whoever commits such a wrong "shall be liable in a civil
section 43(a) see L'Aiglon Apparel v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 651 (3d Cir. 1954), stating

that:
It seems to us that Congress has defined a statutory civil wrong of false
representation of goods in commerce and has given a broad class of suitors injured
or likely to be injured by such wrong the right to relief in the federal courts....
Perhaps this statutory tort bears closest resemblance to the already noted tort of false
advertising to the detriment of a competitor ....But however similar to or different
from pre-existing law, here is a provision of a federal statute which, with clarity and
precision adequate for judicial administration, creates and defines rights and duties
and provides for their vindication in the federal courts. (emphasis added).
Id.
209. See Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 546 (2d Cir.

1956).
210. § 1125(a)(1) (emphasis added).
211. Proctor & Gamble v. Chesebrough-Pond's Inc., 588 F. Supp. 1082, 1092 (S.D.N.Y.
1984).
212. Sunlight Saunas, Inc. v. Sundance Sauna, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1056 (D. Kan.
2006) (citing § 1125(a)(1)).
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action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be
'2 13
damaged by such act."
1.

ELEMENTS TO A SECTION

43(a) CAUSE OF ACTION

In United Industries Corp. v. Clorox Co., a case involving advertising claims that United Industries made concerning its "roach bait insecticide," United Industries, a Clorox competitor in the roach-insecticide
market, sought a declaratory judgment that it was not in violation of
section 43(a). Clorox counterclaimed, seeking to enjoin United Industries from advertising that its product "Kill[ed] Roaches in 24 Hours. ' 1 4
The Eighth Circuit explained:
To establish a claim under the false or deceptive advertising
prong of the Lanham Act [section 43(a)], a plaintiff must prove: (1) a
false statement of fact by the defendant in a commercial advertisement about its own or another's product; (2) the statement actually
deceived or has the tendency to deceive a substantial segment of its
audience; (3) the deception is material, in that it is likely to influence
the purchasing decision; (4) the defendant caused its false statement
to enter interstate commerce; and (5) the plaintiff has been or is likely
to be injured as a result of the false statement, either by direct diversion of sales from itself to defendant or by a loss of goodwill associated with its products.2 1 5
A plaintiff seeking to recover damages under section 43(a) must
additionally prove that the defendant's advertising, in violation of section 43(a) caused the plaintiff to suffer "actual damages."2" 6 Finding the
district court's literal interpretation of the advertisement was warranted,
the court upheld the denial of Clorox's motion.21 7
The remedial nature of the Lanham Act, as well as the courts' typically broad interpretation of section 43(a), imply that the courts should
be fairly willing to entertain a claim for deceptive green marketing that a
plaintiff chooses to bring under the provisions of the Lanham Act.
Although the courts will make these determinations on a case-by-case
basis, in general, standard greenwashing claims should at least meet the
minimal requirements to establish a cause of action under the Lanham
2 18
Act.
213. Id.
214. 140 F.3d 1175, 1178 (8th Cir. 1998).
215. Id. at 1180. See, e.g., Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th
Cir. 1997); Johnson & Johnson Merck Consumer Pharm. Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm.,
Inc., 19 F.3d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1994); ALPO Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958,
964 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
216. Rhone-Poulenc, 93 F.3d at 515.
217. United Indus., 140 F.3d at 1183.
218. Sunlight Saunas, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d at 1056.
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In the context of most greenwashing claims, the defending party
will have "made a false or misleading representation" concerning its

product, which is "in commerce."2" 9 Plaintiffs may have a difficult time
establishing this first element where a business has not made a patently
that its product provides some genfalse claim, but has instead22claimed
°
eral environmental benefit.
The misrepresentation will either "cause confusion" as to "approval
of the product" by claiming that the product has been independently certified as green, or as to the inherent "characteristics" of the product by
22
claiming that the product is 100 percent recyclable, for instance. 1

Finally, the plaintiff in a greenwashing case will have likely been
harmed either as a competing business, meaning the plaintiff will have
to prove a diversion of sales, or as an interested party, in which case the
plaintiff must show some kind of reputational damage.2 22

2.

CATEGORIZING FALSITY

In determining whether a plaintiff has met the first element of a
section 43(a) claim, courts have categorized false statements into three
general categories: "literally false claims," "implicitly false or misleading claims," and puffery. 223 Puffery-"vague and highly subjective representations of product superiority" or "exaggerated advertising . . .
upon which no reasonable buyer would rely"-is not actionable conduct

under section 43(a).224
This categorization is particularly relevant in the greenwashing
context. If a court categorizes a claim as literally false, the plaintiff need
not establish actual consumer confusion to succeed under section 43(a);
instead the court will assume that the plaintiff has met the second ele219. Id.
220. See discussion infra Part V.A.2.
221. Sunlight Saunas, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d at 1056.
222. Id.; see discussion infra Part V.B.
223. See, e.g., Sunlight Saunas, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d at 1180-82 (describing how section 43(a)
applies to "commercial claims that are literally false as a factual matter," along with "claims that
may be literally true or ambiguous but which implicitly convey a false impression, are misleading
in context, or likely to deceive consumers"); Castrol Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 987 F.2d 939, 943, 946
(3d Cir. 1993) (stating that section 43(a) provides two causes of action-one for "an
advertisement that may be false on its face" and for an "advertisement [that] may be literally true,
but ... is likely to mislead and confuse consumers"); Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971
F.2d 6, 13 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining that section 43(a) applies to "literally false" statements and
"statements, which while literally true or ambiguous, convey a false impression or are misleading
in context, as demonstrated by actual consumer confusion"); Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola,
Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 855 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that section 43(a) applies to "advertising [that] is
literally false as a factual matter" and "advertis[ing that] is literally true, [but] ... is likely to
deceive or confuse customers).
224. United Indus. Corp. v. Clorox Co., 140 F.3d 1175, 1180 (8th Cir. 1998).
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ment of the section 43(a) cause of action. 2 5 But if a court categorizes a
claim as implicitly false, the plaintiff must meet a higher burden by
presenting sufficient evidence that the "advertising actually conveyed
the implied message and thereby deceived a significant portion of the
recipients ."226
As expressed earlier in this article, general environmental-benefit
claims, by their very nature, are not literally false.22 7 Even aside from
these claims, TerraChoice found that merely one percent of greenwashing claims involved patent deception. 228 Assuming this is the case, then
courts will classify the vast majority of deceptive environmental-marketing claims as implicitly false or misleading, heightening the burden that
greenwashing plaintiffs face. 22 9 Further, the puffing concern plaguing
general environmental-benefit claims remains visible, and is in fact
heightened in a section 43(a) context where the FTC has not brought the
particular action, and where FTC expertise is lacking.
The courts themselves are not unaware of this concern, as displayed
in Proctor & Gamble v. Chesebrough-Pond's.2 30 The case involved a
claim made by a hand-lotion manufacturer that "no leading lotion
beat[ ]" its product along with a claim by another hand-lotion manufacturer that its product was "superior to all other lotions.9' 23 The court
noted that in such a situation it was clear that "at least one of the advertising claims must be logically wrong. 2 3 2 Recognizing the slow development of section 43(a) jurisprudence in the context of comparative
advertising, the court acknowledged the parties' demand for a further
expansion of this jurisprudence: "[T]he parties attempt to go a significant step further by attacking advertisements that are not obviously false
but that rest upon tests whose efficacy is questioned. 2 3 3
In refusing to take such a leap where the parties' had provided complex testing results as to their products' qualitative value, the court
explained:
[We] however, listened for more than seven days to the testimony of
225. See id. at 1180-81.
226. Id. at 1182-83.
227. See discussion supra Part IV.D.
228. See TERRACHOICE ENVTL. MKTG., supra note 16, at 6.
229. Plaintiffs will need to conduct and present evidence of consumer surveys in order to meet
this burden. See Johnson & Johnson Merck Consumer Pharm. Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer
Pharm., Inc., 19 F.3d 125, 129-30 (3d Cir. 1994); Coca Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prods, Inc., 690
F.2d 312, 317 (2d Cir. 1982); United Indus., 140 F.3d at 1183 ("[S]uccess of the claim usually
turns on the persuasiveness of a consumer survey.").
230. Proctor & Gamble v. Chesebrough-Pond's Inc., 588 F. Supp. 1082, 1093 (S.D.N.Y 1984).
231. Id. at 1084-85.
232. Id. at 1085.
233. Id. 1092-93.
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more than a dozen expert witnesses-statisticians, dermatologists,
chemists, and physicists-and found that much of their testimony
was incomprehensible. Indeed, it is doubtful that there are many, if
any, trial judges who could fully comprehend the testimony. Courts
generally lack the expertise of the FederalTrade Commission when it
comes to evaluating advertisingpractices....

Courts are not always able to determine whether an advertising
claim is true or false, and where this occurs, the only possible conclusion is that the moving party has failed to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the advertising claim is false....
While there are those who believe that for every wrong there must be
a remedy and that courts should intervene where the executive branch
and the legislature have not, there are substantial constitutional

objections to judicial policy-making under our form of
government....
[T]he role that these parties ask the judiciary to play exceeds that
which the judiciary has the power to accept under our form of government. We are dealing with rough tests that have no certifiable
standards and that rest upon nothing more than subjective evaluations .... 234

Courts may rely on such reasoning as they approach the question of
whether they should permit plaintiffs to bring greenwashing claims
under section 43(a).
As the court in Proctor& Gamble explained, courts are simply not
as well-equipped as the FTC to understand and address whether subjective marketing claims are false. At best, courts can address literally false
claims under section 43(a), but claims that are impliedly false, ambiguous, or simply lack objective veracity by their very nature pose ample
risk. Not only do general environmental-benefit claims precisely meet
these categories, 23 5 but the FTC also holds greater expertise and can
devote more time and resources to prosecuting such actions. Whereas
the FTC may solicit public comment and conduct its own consumer
surveys to determine whether a general environmental-benefit claim is
234. Id. at 1093-94.
235. See discussion supra Part IV.C. See also All One God Faith, Inc. v. Hain Celestial Group,
Inc., No. C 09-03517 JF (HRL), 2009 WL 4907433, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2009) (explaining
that "a Lanham Act claim may not be maintained if evaluating the alleged falsity or misleading
nature of the representation at issue would require a court to interpret and apply statutory or
regulatory provisions that fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of a federal government agency").
In a case involving the labeling of cosmetic products as "organic," the court in All One God
further expressed its concern over "whether the false advertising involves a fact that can be easily
verified without requiring the truth of the fact to be determined .... " Id. at *8-9. See Green
Packaging Claims, supra note 41, at 23-24 (remarks of John Kalkowski) (explaining the difficulty
of defining a term like "green," and arguing that "[g]reen could be less damage to the
environment. It could imply that the packaging materials include renewable resources. It could
imply that they are designing the products to be environmentally sustainable").
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deceptive, a court cannot. Instead, the court must rely on the parties for
such evidence, while subsequently forced to scrutinize such evidence.
B.

Concerns over Standing: A Flood of Consumer
Claims under Lanham?

This article argues that while section 43(a) may not be particularly
useful in the context of general environmental-benefit claims, the courts
may be sufficiently equipped to address other kinds of deceptive envi-

ronmental marketing claims under section 43(a). A subsequent concern,
however, is one of standing.
A literal reading of section 43(a) notes that "any person" may bring
a claim under the Lanham Act, while the remaining section specifically

defines "person" as including both "natural" persons and "juristic" persons,2 36 leading various courts to conclude that persons other than competitors may bring a claim under the Lanham Act.2 37 Legislative history
points to a desire to protect both competitors and consumers from deceptive advertising practices. 23 8 According to the Lanham Act, an action
may be brought
by any person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that
of origin or in the region in which said locality is situated, or by any
person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use
of any such false description or representation.239
As a remedial statute, the courts should broadly interpret the Lanham Act. Despite the language of the statute itself, the circuits are split
as to whether only competitors may bring claims under section 43(a), or
whether the courts should permit consumers and other noncompetitors to
24 0
bring such claims as well.
The leading case finding that only business competitors have stand236. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
237. Amesen v. Raymond Lee Org., Inc., 333 F. Supp. 116, 120 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
238. Id.
239. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
240. There is a three-way split among the Circuits currently. First, three Circuits have held that
only direct competitors have standing to bring a claim under section 43(a). See L.S. Heath & Son,
Inc. v. AT & T Info. Sys., Inc., 9 F.3d 561, 575 (7th Cir. 1993); Jack Russell Terrier Network of
N. Cal. v. Am. Kennel Club, Inc., 407 F.3d 1027, 1037 (9th Cir. 2005); Stanfield v. Osborne
Indus., 52 F.3d 867, 873 (10th Cir. 1995). Second, three Circuits have applied a five-factor test to
determine whether a plaintiff has standing under section 43(a), making it possible for a consumer
to proceed under section 43(a) depending on the balance of these factors. See Conte Bros. Auto.,
Inc. v. Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221, 233 (3d Cir. 1998); Proctor & Gamble Co. v.
Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 561-62 (5th Cir. 2001); Phoenix of Broward, Inc. v. McDonald's
Corp., 489 F.3d 1156, 1163-64 (1lth Cir. 2007). Lastly, two circuits interpret standing under
section 43(a) to include non-competitors, but only within a commercial context. See Camel Hair &
Cashmere Institute of Am., Inc. v. Assoc. Dry Goods Corp., 799 F.2d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 1986);
Colligan v. Activities Club of N.Y., LTD., 422 F.2d 686, 693 (2d Cir. 1971).
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ing to bring a claim under section 43(a) is Colligan v. Activities Club of
New York, LTD., which the Second Circuit decided. The case involved a
group of parents who had enrolled their children in a weekend-long ski
program, expecting a complete package and receiving far less than the
ski company had previously advertised.2 4' The court in Colligan specifically noted that the plaintiffs wished to be in federal court but could not
meet the requirements necessary to achieve diversity jurisdiction and
had therefore "imaginatively 2 4 filed an action under the Lanham

Act. 243
While the court in Colligan began its analysis of consumer standing
through the plain language of the statute, the court continued, arguing
that the public policy behind the Lanham Act would never allow for
consumer standing. 24 The court conceded that the legislative history
was silent as to the issue and chose to decide the question as a matter of
policy, reasoning that "the question of consumer standing and that of the
creation of wholly new federal common law of consumer protection
under § 43(a)" could not be "disentwined. '2 45 In the court's opinion,
consumer standing would lead to a flood of Lanham Act claims in federal court, when in reality the states were responsible for providing consumer protection.2 46
Following the decision in Colligan, those who argue that Congress
intended only business competitors to have standing to bring a claim
under the Lanham Act base their reasoning on the idea that the consuming public has other remedies available to it, specifically consumers
2 47
have the option of requesting an enforcement action from the FTC.
The court in Arnesen v. Raymond Lee Organization, Inc. refused 248 to
accept such an argument on the grounds that "[n]othing in the Lanham
Act requires the Federal Trade Commission to be the sole agent for
2 49
consumers."
In the greenwashing context, consumers do not necessarily have
other viable remedies available to them. In recent years, the FTC has
241. 442 F.2d 686, 687 (2d Cir. 1971).
242. The court also noted that such a question of consumer standing under the Lanham Act
was "one of first impression" for all the federal courts. Id.
243. Id. at 688.

244. Id. at 689.
245. Id. at 693.
246. Id.
247. Amesen v. Raymond Lee Org., Inc., 333 F. Supp. 116, 120 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
248. The court in Arnesen rejected the defendant's argument that the judiciary had no place in
protecting consumers where the FFC was involved, reasoning that in the absence of contrary
"legislative intent," Congress must have known that consumers would be within the class of
persons meant "to be protected by the Act." id.
249. Id.
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brought a limited number of enforcement actions against businesses
engaging in deceptive environmental marketing, the Green Guides are
currently outdated, and, even if the Guides were current, they remain
nonbinding.25 ° Similarly, states' incorporation of the Green Guides into
their own law provides consumers with yet another insufficient remedy-state attorneys general can bring such enforcement actions, but
injured parties, namely consumers, cannot bring such actions on their
own. 25 1 At a time of severe economic recession, where states are struggling to meet budgetary needs, there is no guarantee that states will
make the prosecution of greenwashing actions a priority. Common
sense, in fact, suggests otherwise.
The Third Circuit, taking on a broad approach to section 43(a)
standing in Thorn v. Reliance Van Co., recognized that the plain language of section 43(a) mentioned "two distinct classes of persons entitled to sue."' 252 The court noted that these classes included "competitors"
and "non-competitors," which the defendant's misrepresentations have
injured in some respect. 3 The court further relied on general theories of
statutory construction to conclude that the Lanham Act granted standing
to noncompetitors as well as competitors24 Where the language of a
statute is ambiguous, courts may turn to legislative intent in order to
properly construe the statute; however, where the language of the statute
is unambiguous, as in the case of section 43(a), courts "have no occasion
to 'look beyond the plain language of the federal statute.' "25
As the court described in Thorn, courts may settle the standing dispute by choosing to grant standing to plaintiffs who have "a reasonable
interest to be protected against false advertising. 2 56 This distinction is
beneficial to the system generally because it "would eliminate frivolous
claims and prevent flooding the federal courts with Lanham Act claims
250. See discussion supra Parts III.A-B.
251. See discussion supra Part III.B.
252. 736 F.2d 929, 931 (3d Cir. 1984).
253. Id. at 932.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See, e.g., id. at 933 (finding that an investor and officer of a delivery company had a
reasonable interest in bringing a Lanham Act claim against the delivery company because its other
officers had driven the company to bankruptcy through false advertising); Smith v. Montoro, 648
F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding that an actor had a reasonable interest-in terms of
reputational value-in bringing a Lanham Act claim against film distributors for removing the
actor's name from film credits and promotional materials); Camel Hair & Cashmere Institute of
Am., Inc. v. Assoc. Dry Goods Corp., 799 F.2d 6, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1986) (finding that
"manufacturers and vendors of fabric and clothing containing cashmere" had a reasonable
interest-in terms of reputational value-in bringing a Lanham Act claim against retailers
deceptively representing the cashmere content of their products).
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contrary to the type envisioned by Congress. ' 25 7 But although this standing test seems to balance competing interests in a practical manner, the
courts have not directly defined what constitutes a reasonable interest.
The court in Smith v. Montoro settled on this view by examining
the plain language of the Lanham Act and addressing the Second Circuit's narrow interpretation of standing. 8 The court noted that,
although the Second Circuit had ruled that section 43(a) permitted only
competitor standing, the Second Circuit's view had since been "sharply
' 59
criticized."
However, recent decisions concerning section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act suggest that the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits will not broadly
recognize consumer standing based on the precise language of section
43(a), in conjunction with the reasonable interest test. 2 60 Instead, these
circuits have chosen to apply a five-factor standing test 2 6 ' that the
Supreme Court created in the context of a federal antitrust case. 6 2 The
Third Circuit interpreted the five-factor standing test to encompass the
"nature of the plaintiff's injury," the injury's "directness," the party's
"proximity" to the "injurious conduct," the "speculativeness of the damages claim," and the "risk of duplicative damages. '263 Although the
Third Circuit determined in Conte Bros. Automotive v. Quaker StateSlick 50 Inc., that it would adhere to the five-factor standing test to
determine what constitutes a sufficient reasonable interest, 264 the court
did not overturn its earlier decision in Thorn, which provides an arguable basis for consumer standing.26 5
In practice, the Conte Bros. five-factor standing test should allow
for a broad array of plaintiffs, including retailers stocking greenwashed
products who may claim reputational damage. Advertisers-a magazine,
for instance-may also have standing to bring a section 43(a) claim
against businesses that advertise greenwashed products within their
pages, once again basing their claim on reputational damage.
257. Thorn, 736 F.2d at 933.
258. Smith, 648 F.2d at 607.
259. Id. at 608.
260. See Phoenix of Broward, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 489 F.3d 1156, 1156 (11th Cir.
2007); Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 539 (5th Cir. 2001); Conte Bros.
Auto. v. Quaker State-Slick 50 Inc., 165 F.3d 221, 221 (3d Cir. 1998).
261. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State. Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.
519, 519 (1983).
262. See Gregory Apgar, Note, Prudential Standing Limitations on Lanham Act False
Advertising Claims, 76 FORIHAm L. REV. 2389, 2411 (2008), Diane Taing, Comment,
Competitionfor Standing: Defining the Commercial Plaintiff Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act, 16 GEORGE MASON L. Rav. 493, 502-07 (2009).
263. Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 233.

264. Id.
265. Thorn v. Reliance Van Co., 736 F.2d 929, 933 (3d Cir. 1984).
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This is not to say that the courts should utterly transform the Lanham Act into a vehicle for consumer rights, but rather that the courts can
address the current trend in greenwashing by providing this alternative
means of enforcement and regulation. Deceptive advertising may harm
consumers because consumers will pay more for a product because they
believe the product possesses a more valuable characteristic than the
product actually does.266 A consumer will not necessarily have standing
to bring a section 43(a) claim in courts following the five-factor standing
test simply because of their pocket injury; the five-factor test thus will
likely filter out these potential plaintiffs. However, at the very least,
competitors may find an invaluable remedy in terms of section 43(a)
because deceptive environmental advertising can potentially harm competing businesses, by causing them to lose sales2 6 7 to businesses who
greenwash their customers. The idea that businesses that engage in
greenwashing are gaining the upper hand over their less deceptive competitors 268 arguably brings greenwashing claims under the reach of the
Lanham Act, which specifically targets instances of unfair
competition.2 6 9
C.

Concerns over Judicial Involvement

Extending section 43(a)'s reach into the realm of general environmental-benefit claims may go too far, pushing courts into the executive
branch's area of governance by requiring the courts to comprehend
"complex arguments relating to the truth and falsity of advertising
claims. '270 The counter point is that there can be no ight without a
remedy, and, therefore, if the legislature or the executive fails to provide
a remedy, it is in the public's interest for the judiciary to step in.
Consumers and competitors appear to lack a clear remedy in the greenwashing context. First, they can seek redress from the FTC, which may
not choose to bring an enforcement action against an alleged greenwasher, depending on the political climate or surrounding circumstances. Second, they may seek redress via state incorporation of the
Green Guides, but once again, a state's attorney general need not bring
any enforcement action.272 Third, they may choose to bring the dispute
266. See Gary S. Marx, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: A Statutory Cause of Action for
False Advertising, 40 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 383, 384 (1983). See also Raines, supra note 53, at
689 (explaining that consumers are "willing to spend more money for products which are
recyclable and are not harmful to the environment").
267. Marx, supra note 266, at 385.
268. Raines, supra note 53, at 690.
269. Zerpol Corp. v. DMP Corp., 561 F. Supp. 404, 415 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
270. Proctor & Gamble v. Chesebrough-Pond's Inc., 588 F. Supp. 1082, 1094 (S.D.N.Y 1984).
271. Id.
272. As described earlier this remedy is not available in all states, and varies considerably
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before the NAD, but any resolution will not bind the parties.2 73 All that
remains for greenwashed parties is to bring a section 43(a) claim before
the courts.
Before determining that the lack of a guaranteed remedy warrants
judicial interference in this area, one should balance the surrounding circumstances. The courts, unlike federal agencies, are unable to hold public hearings to determine what the public sentiment is concerning a
particular issue, especially issues where the public at large is specifically
concerned.2 74 Separation of powers has granted these enforcement
actions typically to agencies like the FTC, but the judiciary has become
much more involved as of late. "[T]he proliferation of cases like these is
changing the nature of courts from that of a judicial body to that of a
bureaucratic model. ' 27 5 Courts have gone on to say that "one does not
have to oppose judicial activism to recognize that the role that these
parties ask the judiciary to play exceeds that which 6the judiciary has the
27
power to accept under our form of government.
One way to resolve the issue is to distinguish general environmental-benefit claims from specific environmental-benefit claims-in much
the same way that the Green Guides distinguishes the two. 277 In cases
involving specific environmental claims, such as claims involving the
validity of third-party certifications, or claims over terms defined in the
Green Guides, greenwashed parties should not hesitate to bring an action
under section 43(a). The Green Guides define the terms at issue, providing courts with objective standards by which they can determine whether
a particular use of the term "recyclable," for instance, is deceptive.
Even ignoring the guidance provided by the FT1C, the courts can
still arguably resolve such disputes, despite their limited expertise,
because such disputes are similar in nature to traditional deceptiveadvertising disputes. In Rainbow Play Systems, Inc. v. Backyard Adventure, Inc., a South Dakota district court faced a section 43(a) dispute
concerning the manufacturers of wooden playgrounds. 278 The action
centered on each party's use of the term "cedar" to describe the material
they had used to build their products. Each party argued that the other
deceptively described its product as made from cedar, forcing the court
to scrutinize various definitions of the term, along with expert testimony
between states. Consumers and competitors have a private right of action in Indiana. See
discussion supra Part III.C.
273. See discussion supra Part IV.D.
274. Proctor & Gamble, 588 F. Supp. at 1094.

275.
276.
277.
278.

Id.
Id.
Compare 16 C.F.R. § 260.7(a) (2009) with § 260.7(b)-(h).
No. CIV. 06-4166, 2009 WL 3150984, at *1 (D.S.D. Sept. 28, 2009).
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as to consumer understanding of the term.27 9
Similarly, a court facing a greenwashing action over a specific
environmental claim will engage in this traditional analysis. For example, assume that a manufacturer of an independently certified biodegradable shampoo brings a section 43(a) action against the maker of a
competing shampoo, which labels its product as "biodegradable" with a
self-imposed seal, closely resembling a third-party certification label.
The court may turn to objective definitions of the term "biodegradable,"
as well as expert testimony over whether the self-imposed seal would
mislead a reasonable consumer to believe that the product was independently certified as biodegradable.
But courts should not adjudicate general environmental-benefit
claims under section 43(a). As explained earlier,28 traditional deceptiveadvertising analysis does not adequately account for the nuance present
in such actions. Here, courts lack expertise and cannot simply rely on
expert testimony or objective criteria to determine whether a claim is
deceptive because such criteria does not exist. Judicial interference here
would place an unreasonable burden on businesses engaging in environmental marketing because judicial interpretation of vague terms such as
"green," or "eco-friendly" will undoubtedly vary. The risks here simply
outweigh the potential benefits of the remedy.
VI.

A

LACK OF GUIDANCE: CONCERNS OVER A PATCHWORK SYSTEM

As a result of such powerful questions and unending controversy,
commentators and those in the legal practice alike must inevitably question the Supreme Court's failure to intervene to some extent and provide
some form of guidance or stability regarding appropriate enforcement
measures for greenwashing claims. In Ass 'n of NationalAdvertisers, Inc.
v. Lungren,2 81 a federal court "confirmed the state's power to regulate
environmental marketing terms when such terms are potentially confusing and when the means of regulation used are reasonably straightforward. 2 82 As a result of this decision, commentators in the mid 1990s
believed that because the FTC had failed to provide binding guidelines
concerning greenwashing, states would continue to develop their own
statutes defining environmental terms, leading to a "patchwork" of definitions throughout the United States and a system through which few
28 3
companies could navigate.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

See id. at *3-6.
See discussion supra Part V.A.2.
809 F. Supp. 747 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
Hoch & Franz, supra note 1, at 458.
Id. at 463.
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Understandably, commentators predicted that the Supreme Court
would resolve this issue while it was most heated, by granting certiorari
in Ass'n of National Advertisers. Instead the Supreme Court hesitated at
the opportunity and denied certiorari,2 8 4 allowing the controversy to
linger.
But despite such worries, the current state of greenwashing jurisprudence is not particularly inconsistent because numerous states have
incorporated the Guides or portions thereof into their own law. Businesses following the Guides' safe harbors can rest assured that they are
not in violation of state laws concerning deceptive environmental marketing claims.2 85 Granting greenwashed parties the right to bring actions
concerning general environmental-benefit claims under section 43(a)
however, would only revive the "patchwork" problem.2 86
Concerns over inconsistent regulation arise today only in cases
where businesses use terms that the Green Guides do not address. In
these instances, a "patchwork" approach to regulation may in fact exist
as self-regulating bodies, state legislatures, state courts, and the FTC
interpret such terms through dispute resolution, state statutes, adjudication, and enforcement actions. In the early 1990s, similar concerns
resulted in promulgation of the Green Guides and active FTC enforcement. 287 The FTC successfully addressed concerns over "patchwork"
regulation by occupying the field of play to a great extent. The Green
Guides were flexible enough to allow for state incorporation, without
worry that such incorporation would utterly change the law of those
states.
But now, the FTC must start over. The "patchwork" concern
appears cyclical. If the FTC revises its Guides simply to address new
terminology, adding more specific categories and safe harbors, the FTC
will likely succeed in addressing this concern for the time being. But it is
only a matter of time before "patchwork" regulation reemerges. Businesses will develop new terminology, left untouched by the revised
Guides, and self-regulatory bodies, state legislatures, and courts will
likely inconsistently interpret these terms. Is this kind of regulation
practical?
Perhaps the FTC should redesign the Guides to exclude specific
categories, focusing instead on the creation of new, broad principles. By
excluding specific categories, businesses can no longer argue that the
Guides fail to cover a new term, because essentially the Guides will
284.
285.
286.
287.

516
See
See
See

U.S. 812 (1995).
discussion supra Part HI.C.
discussion supra Part V.D.
discussion supra Part III.B.
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cover any environmental marketing term. Similarly, the Guides are
superfluous in cases of specific environmental claims because courts
may examine such claims under traditional deceptive-advertising analysis. The Guides are of great necessity in resolving disputes over general
environmental-benefit claims, and so the FIC should revise its Guides
in such a manner. Whether such revisions are politically viable is an
issue outside the scope of this article.

VII.

THE NEED FOR REGULATIONS: DISAGREEMENTS

An abiding concern remains that limited regulation and enforcement by the FTC will result in blatantly deceptive advertising in the
context of environmental claims. With the FTFC providing nonbinding
guidelines and its shifting degrees of enforcement actions, businesses
may be willing to push the boundaries in a system that may casually
overlook a deceptive "green" advertising claim at a particular point in
time. As a result, some have argued that "[c]ertified green standards
would help hold companies accountable while shining a bright green
light on choices that are actually as eco-friendly as they claim to be." '88
A competing concern, however, is that attempts at green marketing
should not be made completely vulnerable to liability and unsubstantiated claims.28 9 The fact that businesses are marketing their products as
"green" should be viewed as a sign that businesses are moving in the
right direction, towards sustainability.2 9 ° If regulation becomes overly
burdensome, businesses will slow down their efforts and progress will
cease.

29 1

As an indication that the concern over blatantly deceptive advertising has been exaggerated in the greenwashing context, opponents of
strong regulation insist that most greenwashing claims currently relate to
poor information on the part of the businesses, rather than intentionally
deceptive advertising. 29 2 "[A]lmost any kind of green claim can be
debunked, because, inevitably, business operations do have at least some
kind of environmental impact. '"293 At the same time however, "[a]lmost
any green claim can be substantiated to a certain degree as well, depending on how one defines 'environmental improvement."' 294 Once again,
288. Big Green Purse, We Need Sustainable Standards so Consumers Know What To Buy,
ENVTL. NEWS NETWORK, Aug. 22, 2008, http://www.enn.com/top-stories/article/37996.
289. See Shannon Arvizu, Is Greenwashing Good?, ENVTL. NEWS NETWORK, July 15, 2008,
http://www .enn.com/top--stories/article/37664.

290. Id.
291.
292.
293.
294.

Id. See discussion supra Part IV.D.
See discussion supra Part II.
Arvizu, supra note 289.
Id.
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such statements suggest that courts are not competent to resolve section
43(a) disputes over general environmental-benefit claims because courts
are unable to determine whether such claims are deceptive under any
kind of objective criteria.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Although, superficially it would seem that consumers have numerous avenues to enforce greenwashing claims, the lack of uniformity
alongside issues of separation of powers has left consumers remediless
to a large extent. Consumers can petition the FTC to enforce their greenwashing claims and consumers may find solace in the FTC's recent
interest in revising its Green Guides along with its recent enforcement
actions; nonetheless consumers have no guarantee that the FTC will
enforce their claims, while the Green Guides remain nonbinding
regulations.
Certain states provide remedies where businesses that engage in
greenwashing have harmed consumers, but only Indiana provides a private cause of action for deceptive environmental claims. Consumers in
states that have incorporated the Green Guides must rely on the state's
attorney general to bring such a claim. Either way, consumers may wish
to have a federal remedy available to them as well, especially in states
that have not incorporated the Green Guides into their law, or have
incorporated limited portions of the Guides. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides a reasonable alternative for these consumers, as well
as for injured businesses, but practical considerations remain.
Courts cannot adequately address disputes concerning general environmental-benefit claims because they lack the FTC's expertise in this
area and, an attempt to resolve such claims will likely qualify as an
intrusion into the executive's realm of power to enforce. Because of this
concern, courts should restrict the scope of section 43(a) to include only
actions derived from allegedly deceptive specific environmental-benefit
claims. Secondly, courts are also concerned that a flood of litigation
would result from a further expansion of section 43(a)'s scope. Such a
concern is reasonable, but limiting principles can dissuade potential litigants, and, until either the FTC steps into its own role of protecting
consumers, other means of protection need to be examined, especially in
the face of thriving greenwash campaigns. One should consider three
possible scenarios that may result from growing disputes over environmental marketing claims in a time where greenwashing appears
prevalent.
The first of these scenarios involves an active FTC in the wake of a
changing political climate. It is entirely possible that the FTC will no
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longer turn a blind eye toward environmental marketing claims as a
result of its latest revisions to its Green Guides. While the Green Guides
remain nonbinding, an active FTC, having revised the Guides to encompass a greater variety of potential claims, need only bring a small number of relatively high-profile enforcement actions in order to achieve
some sort of equilibrium. Such enforcement actions would clearly
inform businesses that the FTC will no longer tolerate blatant greenwashing, while simultaneously restoring the confidence of the consuming public in the FTFC's ability and willingness to resume its role in
consumer protection.
However, there is no guarantee that an active FTC will provide the
optimal solution to long-term concerns over greenwashing. While active
FTC enforcement may restore consumer confidence, it may be less successful at deterring greenwashing efforts by businesses. The FTC, like
any enforcement agency, will not likely have the resources at its disposal
to consistently bring enforcement actions against businesses that greenwash. Similarly, it would be highly impractical for the FFC to continuously revise its Green Guides, and yet without constant revision, the
Guides will almost certainly remain incomplete and outdated. Businesses will quickly identify the Guides' loopholes and shift their marketing efforts in a new direction. The FTC will inevitably find itself trotting
along at the heels of greenwashers, but ultimately unable to overtake
them.
A second scenario hinges on the FTC's revised Green Guides as
well, but within the context of the states. If the FTC were to remain
inactive following its broad revision of the Green Guides, states may
fulfill the FTC's obligations to protect consumers by providing adequate
remedies for greenwashing claims in their court systems by incorporating the revised Green Guides into their own binding state laws. Consumers and competitors harmed by deceptive environmental marketing could
then present their claims to state attorneys general, rather than having to
rely on the FTC's intermittent enforcement actions.
This scenario seems particularly likely, but it is not without its own
drawbacks. Not all states will choose to incorporate the revised Green
Guides into their own laws, resulting in varying degrees of regulation by
state. Consumers will still have no practical federal remedy available to
them and consumers in certain states-those that do not incorporate the
revised Green Guides-may have no actual remedy at all. Furthermore,
the current economic climate suggests that states will simply not focus
their attention and resources on deceptive environmental claims. Additionally, if a significant number of states choose not to incorporate the
revised Green Guides, but rather devise their own system for deceptive

1404

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:1353

environmental marketing claims, consumers and businesses alike would
face great degrees of uncertainty in this area. Such inconsistent regulation occurred in the early 1990s, leading the FTC to promulgate the
Guides, so it is likely that this scenario would again lead the FTC toward
another set of revisions to its Guides, or simply the creation of new and
clearer standards.
Lastly, there remains the possibility that if the FTC remains inactive, the courts will begin to recognize greenwashing claims within the
context of the Lanham Act. This scenario is further complicated by the
controversy over section 43(a)'s standing requirement, resulting in two
possible outcomes. First, if the courts choose to allow for broad standing, consumers will finally have a federal cause of action available to
them to bring forward their greenwashing claims.
Such an outcome is particularly problematic if courts attempt to
resolve disputes over general environmental-benefit claims. Federal
courts would likely find themselves flooded with environmental-marketing claims, with little experience in the field that would aid the courts in
differentiating between viable and frivolous suits. Unlike traditional
claims over deceptive advertising, general environmental-benefit claims
are not objectively verifiable and therefore courts would not be able to
determine the viability of such claims in the early stages of litigation.
Furthermore, litigants would likely continue to bring greenwashing
claims in the courts of those states that have incorporated the Green
Guides into their law. This could potentially pose a problem for uniformity of interpretation because the federal courts may choose to
examine greenwashing claims under general deceptive-advertising principles, while state courts will be examining nearly identical greenwashing claims under their interpretation of the FTC's Green Guides. But
more likely, federal courts, interpreting specific environmental-benefit
claims, will turn to the Green Guides for assistance, making the concern
over lack of uniformity irrelevant.
Second, the courts may instead settle on granting competitor standing in the context of greenwashing claims under section 43(a) in which
case consumers remain without a viable federal remedy. This outcome is
far less problematic because consumers could no longer flood the federal
courts with greenwashing claims, but competitors would retain their federal cause of action against fellow greenwashing businesses. It is likely
that competitor standing would result in a focus on higher-profile claims
with stronger chances of success, leading to a more useful development
of the law in this area. One could even argue that the interests of consumers would still be served through competitor standing because these
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actions would have a stronger deterrent effect on greenwashing businesses as they face a higher level of scrutiny in the federal court system.
Although each of these scenarios has its distinct benefits as well as
drawbacks, there is a strong divergence between which scenario is most
likely and which is preferable. The benefits of providing a remedy for
deceptive specific environmental-benefit claims through competitor
standing under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act seem to clearly outweigh potential concerns; it remains unclear as to whether the judiciary
will take on such an active role in the realm of greenwashing. It seems
considerably more likely that the states will embrace their traditional
role of protecting consumer interests and expand this role by incorporating the newly revised Green Guides into their own statutes, giving binding effect to the Guides within state courts, but that does not mean the
states will use their resources to bring any actions. The results currently
hinge greatly on future actions by the FTC, including enforcement
actions and any substantial changes to the Green Guides, alleviating
potential "patchwork" concerns. At this point it may be unreasonable to
expect any significant changes in the Guides, but an active FTC is not
entirely unlikely.

